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Business rescue proceedings have been introduced into South African company law 
under chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The United States Chapter 11 
bankruptcy model was closely consulted by the legislature when drafting chapter 6. 
Further to this and although business rescue has been generally well received, there have 
been legal issues which have arisen in the interpretation of chapter 6. In particular, the 
issue of creditors' rights against third party sureties of financially distressed companies 
continues to fall under the spotlight which, in tum, has caused a ripple of commercial 
uncertainty to filter through to creditors. This issue will be investigated with comparative 
reference to the position in the United States. In doing so, a critical analysis will be 
undertaken of the procedures and processes in both of these jurisdictions, whereafter a 
comparative analysis will be presented. It will be advocated that although the essential 
difference between the two jurisdictions is the United States' legislative regulation on 
this issue, South African courts have correctly decided on creditors' rights against third 
party sureties. Unlike in the United States where conflicting decisions have been 
delivered, commercial certainty on this issue does in fact exist in South Africa 
notwithstanding the lack of statutory regulation under the Companies Act. It will be 
further advocated that although there is potential for this issue to be development under 
the South African common law when having regard to the decisions in the United States, 
caution is to be exercised as such development may generate commercial uncertainty. 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The notion of business rescue was introduced into our law as part of Chapter 6 of the 
new Companies Act
1
 which came into force on 1 May 2011. For purposes of 
enhancing the prospects of the revival and continued business operations of 
financially distressed companies for the general benefit of stakeholders and the 
economy, business rescue was introduced in place of the unsuccessful procedure of 
judicial management.
2
 Although the introduction of business rescue into our law has 
for the most part been warmly received,
3
 the practical implementation of business 
rescue has not been without its challenges, this being the result in no small part due to 
certain lacunae in the Companies Act. 
Focus of this Research Paper 
This research paper will focus on the current legal position in South Africa as 
to whether a creditor loses its claim against a surety if a duly adopted and 
implemented business rescue plan provides for such creditor’s claim against a 
principal debtor to be compromised in full and final settlement. In doing so, this 
research paper will comparatively explore how this issue has been administered under 




 Structure and Overview of Chapters in this Research Paper 
In chapter 2 of this research paper, the nature of business rescue will briefly be 
examined and discussed. In chapter 3 and given its significance to this research paper, 
the nature and purpose of suretyships will be discussed and relevant cases will be 
cited. In chapter 4, the most recent and material decisions of South African courts will 
be examined to determine the current legal position on creditors’ rights against 
sureties pre and post the adoption of a business rescue plan. This will include a 
research of cases dealing with the statutory moratorium specified in s 133(1) as well 
                                                          
1
 Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Companies Act’). Any reference in this research paper, whether 
in the main body or footnotes to a section, shall be a reference to a section in the Companies Act, unless the 
context provides otherwise. 
2
 Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greeff and Another 2014 (3) SA 500 (WCC) paras 20 and 26. 
3
 Richard Bradstreet ‘The Leak in the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue 
Practitioners may Adversely Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the Economy’ (2010) 22 SA MERC 
LJ 195-213 at 197. See also H Stoop and A Hutchison ‘Post-Commencement Finance-Domiciled Resident or 
Uneasy Foreign Transplant? (2017) 20 PER/PELJ at 2. 
4
 Title 11, United States Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Bankruptcy Codes’). 
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as a consideration of s 155, which details the compromise of debts between a debtor 
and its creditors. In particular, s 155(9), which details creditors’ rights against sureties 
in circumstances of compromise, will also be discussed. Chapter 5, similarly to 
chapter 2, will set the foundation for what follows in chapter 6 by examining the 
framework of reorganisation proceedings under the Bankruptcy Codes. Chapter 6 will 
elaborate on the legal position of creditors’ rights against non-debtors of entities 
which have filed for bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings in the United States of 
America. In doing so, a review will be undertaken on how courts have applied the 
interplay between s 524(e) and s 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Codes in determining 
whether to release non-debtors under a non-consensual reorganisation plan. Thereafter 
and in chapter 7, a comparative analysis will be presented on the respective legal 
positions adopted by the South African and American courts to determine the 
similarities and differences relating to the issue of enforceability of suretyships by 
creditors during business rescue and post the adoption and subsequent implementation 
of a business rescue plan, if any. 
 Contention of this Research Paper 
It is the contention of this research paper that South African courts have 
correctly determined the legal position on creditors being able to enforce their rights 
against sureties subsequent to the adoption of a business rescue plan. This will be 
advocated when compared against the Bankruptcy Codes which, unlike the South 
African Companies Act, embed creditors’ rights against sureties in statute and 
regulate creditors’ rights against non-debtors following a discharge of debt between a 
principal debtor and its creditors under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Codes. 
Furthermore, this research paper advocates the importance of legal certainty for 
purposes of ensuring, for the most part, commercial certainty and the importance 
thereof to society during the business rescue process. To this end, this paper will 
advocate that whilst there is potential to develop South African company law having 
reference to the Bankruptcy Codes, caution is to be exercised when doing so.  
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2. CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter 2, as well chapter 3, are to provide a high-level legal 
analysis on the two central components discussed during this research paper, namely 
business rescue and suretyships. This chapter will briefly focus on the nature of 
business rescue proceedings. This chapter will also explore the shift in focus from a 
‘creditor-friendly’ to a ‘debtor-friendly’ process by means of the introduction of 
business rescue proceedings in the Companies Act. The commencement and 
termination of business rescue proceedings, the operation of the legal moratorium 
during such time and, significantly, the consequences of the adoption, or rejection, of 
a business rescue plan will also be discussed.  
 
2.2. NATURE OF BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS 
The procedure for regulating the business rescue of financially distressed 
companies
5
 is set out in chapter 6 of the Companies Act. The term ‘business rescue’ is 
considered more apt than its counterpart term used in the United States of America, 
‘corporate rescue,’ given that the emphasis is on the survival of the business 
enterprise conducted by the financially distressed company, as opposed to the survival 
of the actual entity itself.
6
 s 128(b) describes business rescue as, among other things, 
facilitating the rehabilitation of a financially distressed company. Although the term 
‘rehabilitation’ is not defined in the Companies Act, it suggests that the purpose of 




 During business rescue a company’s management is taken out of the control of 
its directors and placed in the hands of a business rescue practitioner for purposes of 
supervision. During this time, and as further discussed in 2.5, a legal moratorium 
operates for the protection of the company by limiting the rights which creditors may 
                                                          
5
 In terms of s 128(f), ‘financially distressed,’ in reference to a particular company at any particular time, means 
that- 
(i) it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as they become 
due and payable within the immediately ensuing six month; or 
(ii) it appears that the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six months. 
6
 Bradstreet op cit note 3 at 195. 
7
 Hans Klopper and Richard S Bradstreet ‘Averting Liquidations with Business Rescue: Does a section 155 
Compromise Place the Bar too High?’ STELL LR (2014) 549-565 at 550. 
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have in instituting legal proceedings against the company for the duration of the 
business rescue process. The primary goal of business rescue
8
 is the survival of the 
business enterprise of a company which is facilitated by means of a business rescue 
plan which is populated and, if accepted,
9
 implemented to restructure the company’s 
affairs, together with its business, property, debt, other liabilities and equity, such that 
the company can continue its business enterprise on a solvent basis. To the extent that 
the primary goal cannot be achieved, the secondary goal
10
 is to generate a return for 
shareholders and creditors of a company greater than that which they would have 




2.3. DEBTOR FRIENDLY PROCESS 
Unlike its predecessor,
12
 the Companies Act focuses on the financially 
distressed company in question and primarily seeks to rehabilitate such entity whilst 
balancing the interests of all other relevant stakeholders.
13
 This is supported by s 7(k) 
which provides that the purpose of the Companies Act is to, among other things, 
effect business rescue ‘in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant 
stakeholders.’  
Although the movement away from a ‘creditor friendly’ approach under the 
Old Companies Act to a ‘debtor friendly’ one is undoubtedly favourable to the debtor, 
caution is to be exercised on placing too much emphasis on the protection of debtors’ 
rights as this could potentially create a disincentive for creditors to finance the 
business operations of such debtors.
14
 This is of particular significance in the context 
of creditors’ rights to enforce third party suretyships where companies have been 
placed in business rescue. Financially distressed companies are already afforded a 
‘second chance’ under business rescue. To deprive creditors of their rights to enforce 
third party suretyships during such proceedings in addition to this would 
unquestionably increase creditors’ risk associated with the advancement of finance to 
debtors. Creditors play a key role in the development and continued sustainability of 
                                                          
8
 Ibid at 550. 
9
 s 150(1). 
10
 Klopper and Bradstreet op cit note 7 at 550. 
11
 s 128(b)(iii). 
12
 The Companies Act 61 of 73 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Old  Companies Act’). 
13
 Bradstreet op cit note 3 at 197-98. 
14
 Ibid at 198. 
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economic growth and caution is to be exercised in adopting an approach which 




2.4. COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION 
Commencement 
Business rescue proceedings can either be commenced by the board of 
directors of a financially distressed company
16
 or on application by an affected 
person
17
 to the relevant high court having jurisdiction.
18
 In either instance, there must 
be reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed. This 
entails, on the one hand, a cash-flow insolvency test on the basis of determining 
whether the company will be unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Alternatively and 
on the other hand, a balance-sheet test enquiry can be conducted to determine 
whether, at any particular time, the value of a company’s assets do not exceed the 
value of its liabilities.
19
 That said and on application by an affected person to court, 
the grounds for commencing business rescue is not limited to a cash flow or balance 
sheet insolvency enquiry, instead the requirements which are to be satisfied to 
commence proceedings are more complex.
20
 
Under s 129 business rescue proceedings commence upon the filing of a board 
resolution with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (‘CIPC’). 
Where an application to commence such proceedings has been launched by an 
affected person under s 131, such proceedings commence upon the court placing a 
company under supervision and ordering the commencement of business rescue.
 21
 
Having said this, there are certain restrictions against the institution of such 
                                                          
15
 Ibid at 199. 
16
 s 129. In terms of this section, a resolution can only be passed by the board of directors where the board has 
reasonable grounds to believe that (i) the company is financially distressed and (ii) there appears to be a 
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. 
17
 s 131. An ‘affected person’ is defined in s 128(a) as meaning – 
(i) a shareholder or creditor of the company; 
(ii) any registered trade union representing employees of the company; and  
(iii) if any of the employees of the company are not represented by registered trade union, each of those 
employees or their respective representatives. 
18
 Unlike in terms of s 129, under s 131(4) it is left to the courts’ discretion to determine whether (i) the 
company is financially distressed and there is a reasonable prospect for rescue or (ii) whether it is otherwise just 
and equitable to order the commencement of business rescue proceedings in the circumstances. 
19
 Jonathan Rushworth ‘A critical analysis of the business rescue regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 
(2010) Acta Juridica 375-408 at 377. 
20
 Ibid at 381. 
21





 For example, the board of directors cannot resolve to place a company 
under business rescue where liquidation proceedings have already been initiated by or 
against the company,
23
 nor are such proceedings commenced until the board 
resolution resolving to place the company in business rescue has been filed at CIPC. 
In addition to the foregoing, the court may during business rescue proceedings, but 
before the adoption of a business rescue plan in accordance with s 152, set aside such 
proceedings if, having regard to all evidence, the court considers that it is otherwise 
just and equitable to do so.
24
  
Having regard to business rescue proceedings initiated by an affected person, 
such an application cannot be made where a resolution has been passed first in time 
by the board of directors in terms of s 129.
25
 Where liquidation proceedings have 
already been instituted by or against a company before an application by an affected 
person for its business rescue, such liquidation proceedings are suspended pending 
determination by the court of the application.
26
 Once placed under business rescue by 
the court, a company may not pass a resolution resolving to place itself in liquidation 




Business rescue proceedings terminate where a court has set aside a board 
resolution commencing business rescue proceedings
28
 or converted such proceedings 
into liquidation proceedings.
29
 In addition to this, where a business rescue plan has 
been adopted and implemented, such proceedings terminate upon the filing of a notice 
of substantial implementation of the plan by the business rescue practitioner with 
CIPC. Where a business rescue plan has been rejected, and a revised plan is not 
published,
30
 or the business rescue practitioner has not applied to court to set aside the 
result of the vote against the adoption of the plan,
31
 or any affected person has not 
made a binding offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more persons who 
                                                          
22
 Rushworth op cit note 19 at 378. 
23
 s 129(2)(a).  
24
 s 130(5)(a)(ii). 
25
 s 131(1). 
26
 s 131(6). 
27
 s 131(8). 
28
 s 132(2)(a)(i). 
29
 s 132(2)(a)(ii). 
30
 s 153(1)(a)(i). 
31
 s 153(1)(a)(ii). 
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opposed adoption of the plan,
32
 then the business rescue proceedings are terminated 




2.5. LEGAL MORATORIUM 
In terms of s 133, for the duration of the business rescue proceedings, a 
financially distressed company enjoys the protection of a legal moratorium. This 
entails that no legal proceeding, including enforcement action, may be commenced or 
proceeded with against a company, or its property or in respect of property lawfully in 
its possession, subject to the exceptions specified in s 133(1). The Companies Act
34
 
expressly specifies that, save for certain exceptions, during business rescue 
proceedings a guarantee or surety provided by the financially distressed company in 
favour of another person may not be enforced by that person. Having said this, the 
Companies Act is silent on creditors’ rights to enforce third party suretyships 
provided for the obligations of a financially distressed company during such 
proceedings.  
The legal moratorium is at the heart of this research paper’s analysis on 
whether a creditor loses their right to pursue their claim against a surety pre and post 
the adoption and implementation of business rescue plan which provides for such 
creditor’s claim to be compromised in full and final settlement. The legal moratorium 
is of significance given that the enquiry is twofold as to whether creditors of 
companies, which have been placed under business rescue, can enforce third party 
suretyships. First, an enquiry must be had as to whether creditors are prohibited from 
proceeding against a third party surety as a result of the legal moratorium which 
endures for the business rescue process. If not and secondly, an enquiry must be had 
as to whether creditors can proceed against a surety notwithstanding a compromise of 
their claim in full and final settlement with the principal debtor in the business rescue 
plan.  
 
2.6. THE BUSINESS RESCUE PLAN 
Subsequent to the commencement of business rescue proceedings, the 
business rescue practitioner, who has been appointed to supervise the affairs and 
                                                          
32
 s 153(1)(b)(ii). 
33
 s 153(5). 
34
 s 133(2). 
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administration of a financially distressed company, must prepare a business rescue 
plan. The business rescue plan is populated and presented to affected persons for 
consideration.
35
 The principal purpose of the business rescue plan is to assist creditors 
in making a determination whether or not to accept or reject the plan.
36
 
The business rescue plan is divided into three parts. The first part of the plan 
must set out its background including, among other things, a material asset list of the 
company,
37
 a complete list of creditors of the company when the business rescue 
proceedings began
38
 and the return that creditors would receive if the company were 
to otherwise be placed into liquidation.
39
 The second part of the plan which sets forth 
proposals, and which is of significance for purposes of this research paper, must 
specify, among other things, the nature and duration of any moratorium for which the 
plan makes provision
40
 and the extent to which the company is to be released from 
any debts.
41
 This is of significance given that, for all intents and purposes, it is in this 
part of the plan that proposals of compromise with creditors will be proposed and 
voted on. Given the accessory nature of suretyships, further discussed in 3.4 below, it 
is this section of the business rescue plan, pursuant to its adoption, that has been at the 
heart of much of the debate surrounding creditors’ rights of enforcement against third 
party sureties. The third and final part of the plan must provide for assumptions and 
conditions. This entails that any conditions to which the plan is subject must be 
specified
42
 and the assumed effect, if any, that it will have on employees,
43
 the 
circumstances in which the plan will terminate,
44
 a projected balance sheet for the 




The business rescue plan is subsequently presented by the business rescue 
practitioner to creditors for consideration.
46
 The plan is adopted provided that it is 
                                                          
35
 s 150(1). 
36
 s 150(2). 
37
 s 150(2)(a)(i). 
38
 s 150(2)(a)(ii). 
39
 s 150(2)(a)(iii). 
40
 s 150(2)(b)(i). 
41
 s 150(2)(b)(ii). 
42
 s 150(2)(c)(i). 
43
 s 150(2)(c)(ii). 
44
 s 150(2)(c)(iii). 
45
 s 150(2)(c)(iv). 
46
 s 151. 
13 
 
supported by more than 75 per cent of creditors’ voting interests that were voted
47
 and 
that votes in support of the proposed plan included at least 50 per cent of independent 
creditors’ voting interests.
48
 The consequence of a plan which has satisfied the voting 
percentages aforesaid are that it binds the company, each creditor and every holder of 
securities in the company.
49
 This is of significance in the context of this research 
paper given that should a creditor have agreed to the release of a company for its debt 
it would effectively be agreeing to a compromise and, in turn, releasing a third party 
surety from its obligations to the creditor given the accessory nature of suretyships. 
This finds support in s 154 which provides that: 
‘(1) A business rescue plan may provide that, if it is implemented in accordance with 
its terms and conditions, a creditor who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or 
part of a debt owing to that creditor will lose the right to enforce the relevant debt or 
part of it. 
(2) If a business rescue plan has been approved and implemented in accordance with 
this Chapter, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company 
immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent 
provided for in the business rescue plan.’ 
  
                                                          
47
 s 152(2)(a). 
48
 s 152(2)(b). 
49
 s 150(4).  
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3. CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF SURETYSHIPS 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter 3 will focus, in brief, on the legal nature of suretyships in South 
Africa. This chapter will explore the nature and purpose of a suretyship, particularly 
within the commercial environment, the law under which suretyships are regulated 
and the importance of such security to creditors. This chapter will not explore 
suretyships in the context of business rescue as that aspect will be central to 
discussion in chapter 4 below. 
 
3.2. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF SURETYSHIPS 
Regard was had to the text contained in Caney’s Law of Suretyship
50
 in the 
case of Nedbank v Van Zyl,
51
 where consideration was had to defining a suretyship as 
follows: 
‘Suretyship is an accessory contract by which a person (the surety) undertakes to the creditor 
of another (the principal debtor), primarily that the principal debtor, who remains bound, will 
perform his obligation to the creditor and, secondarily that if and so far as the principal debtor 
fails to do so, he, the surety, will perform it or, failing that, indemnify the creditor.’
52
 
Suretyships are a personal form of security and are accessory contracts in 
nature,
53
 meaning that their existence and enforcement is conditional upon a principal 
debt, whether this be a debt or other form of obligation, being in existence, or coming 
into existence,
54
 between a principal debtor and a creditor.
55
 A practical example of a 
suretyship is where a third party agrees to assume the obligations of a debtor to a 
creditor in terms of a loan agreement in the event of there being a breach of such loan 
agreement by the debtor. Should the debtor fail to discharge its obligations to the 
creditor in accordance with the terms of the loan agreement, the creditor has the right 
to proceed against the third party surety, such that the surety discharge the obligations 
                                                          
50
 The most recent version of this publication is CF Forsyth and JT Pretorius Caneys the Law of Suretyship 6 ed 
(2010). The third edition of this book published in 1982 was cited in the case of Van Zyl. Reference is to be had 
to page 27 of this third publication. 
51
 1990 2 SA 469 (A). 
52
 Ibid at 59. 
53
 CF Forsyth and JT Pretorius Caneys the Law of Suretyship 6 ed (2010) 28. 
54
 See the case of Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 1977 (3) SA 562 (A) at 584G-H where it was held that a 
suretyship will be enforceable even where reference is had in such a suretyship to a principal obligation which 
will only come into existence in the future. 
55
 Robert dos Santos: ‘The lazy man’s suretyship: Are unlimited debts of limited application?’ available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2015/156.pdf, accessed on 27 December 2017. 
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of the debtor to the creditor. In circumstances where a creditor has recovered money 
from the surety, the surety can then, in turn, have recourse against the principal debtor 
as a consequence of having discharged the latter’s financial debt to its creditor. 
 
3.3. STATUTORY REGULATION OF SURETYSHIPS 
Before the introduction of the General Law of Amendment Act,
56
 the common 
law was responsible for the administration of suretyships and such security documents 
could even be entered into orally.
57
 Similarly to the Alienation of Land Act,
58
 which 
requires that agreements in respect of the sale of immovable property be reduced to 
writing, the GLAA sought to avoid unnecessary litigation between creditors and 
sureties and specified in s 6 of that Act that ‘[n]o contract of suretyship entered into 
after the commencement of this Act, shall be valid, unless the terms thereof are 
embodied in a written document signed by or on behalf of the surety…’ 
The meaning of the word ‘terms’ in s 6 of the GLAA is not defined, and this 
was addressed by the court in Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison,
59
 where it was held 
that the identification of the principal debt and the debtor are essential to a creditor 
imposing liability on a surety. The terms of the suretyship must therefore set out the 
obligations and scope of a surety’s rights.
60
 In determining what constitutes the 
essential terms of a suretyship, it was held by the court in Sapirstein and Others v 
Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd
61
 that these include: 
‘the identity of the creditor, of the surety and of the principal debtor, and the nature 
and amount of the principal debt, must be capable of ascertainment by reference to 
the provisions of the written document, supplemented, if necessary, by extrinsic 
evidence of identification other than evidence by the parties (namely the creditor and 






                                                          
56
 Act 50 of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘GLAA’). 
57
 Forsyth and Pretorius op cit note 53 at 67. 
58
 Act 68 of 1981. 
59
 1977 (1) SA 333 (A). 
60
 Ibid at 345. 
61
 1978 (4) SA 1 (A). 
62
 Ibid at 7. See also the case of Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 523 (GSJ) where the 
dictum in Sapirstein was upheld and the court stated that ‘[t]he essential terms of the contract of suretyship are 
the identity of the creditor, the identity of the surety, and the nature and amount of the principal debt. Failure to 
complete the essential terms of the suretyship agreement means that the contract is invalid for failure to comply 
with the statutory formalities.’ 
16 
 
3.4. ACCESSORY NATURE OF SURETYSHIPS 
The accessory nature of suretyships is referenced in several of the cases to be 
discussed in chapter 4. In understanding the meaning of the word ‘accessory,’ the 
court in Corrans v Transvaal Government and Coull’s Trustee
63
 held that the liability 
of a surety to a creditor is dependent upon the existence of a principal debt.
64
 In other 
words, should the principal debt not exist then a creditor will not, in turn, have any 
claim against a surety. This notion is explored in depth by Rogers AJ, as he was then, 
in Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns,
65
 where the notion of the defences in rem and in 
personam were measured against the statutory moratorium contained in s 133.  
It was held in the case of Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) 
Ltd & Another
66
 that the defence of in rem can be relied upon where the defence 
attaches to the claim itself, thereby entailing that if the claim itself by a creditor 
against the principal debtor is extinguished or discharged, so too is the claim against 
the surety similarly extinguished. Therefore, and for all intents and purposes, should 
the underlying cause giving rise to the principal debt or obligation be illegal, for 
example a person entering into a contract without the requisite legal capacity, the 
subsequent result is that the cause giving rise to a creditor’s claim against the debtor is 
extinguished and therefore as a consequence the creditor will have no claim against 




3.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF SURETYSHIPS TO CREDITORS 
Suretyships are of particular significance in the commercial sphere where 
creditors have concluded transactions with juristic persons. In such cases and for 
example, as a suspensive condition to a loan agreement to be concluded between a 
company, as borrower, and a creditor, as lender, the company’s directors may be 
required to stand as surety and co-principal debtors with the company for its 
obligations to the creditor. On a commercial basis, the inclusion of the requirement to 
conclude a suretyship is understood where, for example, the company is a newly 
incorporated entity and has no assets against which the creditor would be able to 
execute in order to realise a return on its claims against the debtor.  
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4. CHAPTER 4: BUSINESS RESCUE: SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter 4 will focus on business rescue proceedings and the effect which such 
proceedings have on creditors’ rights against third party sureties of financially 
distressed companies. Given the lack of statutory regulation on this legal issue in 
South Africa, an analysis of case law takes centre stage in this chapter. 
 
4.2. CREDITORS’ RIGHTS BEFORE BUSINESS RESCUE PLAN 
The cases discussed under this 4.2 focus on creditors’ rights against third party 
sureties during business rescue proceedings but before the adoption and 
implementation of a business rescue plan. This 4.2 specifically focuses on the legal 
implications of the legal moratorium embedded in s 133(1). 
 Bruyns 
The case of Bruyns
68
 was one of the first cases before our courts to provide 
insight on defences raised by third party sureties during business rescue proceedings 
and the effect of the legal moratorium carried into effect by s 133(1) of the 
Companies Act. In this case, summary judgment proceedings had been launched 
against the defendant whereby the plaintiff sought to claim, among other things, 
payment from the defendant flowing from two suretyships which the defendant had 
executed for two principal debtor companies that had been placed in liquidation,
69
 
which companies however it was alleged, had commenced with business rescue in 
terms of s 131(6).
70
 In its opposing affidavit, the defendant sought to challenge 
summary judgment having regard to the provisions of s 133(1).
71
 This section, in 
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 against the company, or in relation to any property 
belonging to a company, or lawfully in its possession.
 74
 As a consequence of the legal 
moratorium embedded in s 133(1), the defendant placed reliance on s 133(2),
75
 and 
argued that the legal moratorium enjoyed by the financially distressed company also 
extended to the benefit of a surety or guarantor.
76
  
Rogers AJ first turned to consider the defence raised in respect of s 133(2). 
The court held that the provisions of the section are clear in that they are only to be 
enjoyed by a financially distressed company, not its third party sureties or 
guarantors.
77
 The court then turned to explore 133(1) having regard to the defences of 
in rem and in personam. Placing reliance on the decision in Worthington v Wilson,
78
 
the court acknowledged that a defence in personam is one which is strictly available 
only for reliance upon by a principal debtor, not a third party surety or guarantor.
79
 
The court held that the legal moratorium embedded in s 133(1) is a defence in 
personam and no reliance thereon could be raised by a third party surety or 
guarantor
80
 and as a result of this the court subsequently granted the application for 
summary judgment. 
Although it was only mentioned in obiter by Rogers AJ,
81
 the court held that 
the defendant surety could not complain of the outcome given that even the terms of 
suretyships executed by the defendant provided that the creditors’ rights were not 
compromised in the event of liquidation or judicial management.
82
 Having said this, 
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regard must be had to the impact of this decision in the timeline of business 
proceedings. The issues in this case were ones arising after business rescue 
proceedings had commenced, however, before the adoption of a business rescue plan. 
The court was clear that third party sureties and guarantors could be sued during 
business rescue proceedings for the obligations of a principal debtor to its creditor 
notwithstanding the legal moratorium enjoyed by a financially distressed company. 
 Tsakiroglou 
In Business Partners Limited v Tsakiroglou and Others,
83
 the legal 
moratorium survived constitutional scrutiny. In this case, the plaintiff carried on the 
business of a registered credit provider and financier and the first defendant had 
executed a deed of suretyship in favour of the plaintiff for the obligations of a close 
corporation of which the defendant was the sole member.
84
 The defendant surety had, 
by way of resolution in terms of s 129, placed the financially distressed entity under 
business rescue. The business rescue plan which was pitched to the plaintiff, the 
holder of 100% voting interest,
85
 failed to address the defendant’s liability and 
therefore the business rescue plan was rejected at both meetings of creditors.
86
     
Similarly to the issue raised in Bruyns,
87
 the defendant surety raised the 
defence that he, in conjunction with the financially distressed entity, was entitled to 
rely on the legal moratorium embedded in s 133.
88
 Interestingly in this matter, and 
unlike in Bruyns,
89
 the defence on the same issue was dressed in a constitutional 
grab.
90
 The constitutional argument raised was that whilst s 133 specifically precluded 
legal proceedings from being instituted against a financially distressed company,
91
 it 
did not preclude such proceedings from being commenced against a guarantor or 
surety of that financially distressed entity.
92
 The defence centred on the notion that s 
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133 ‘…differentiates between people or categories of people, and such differentiation 
bears no rational connection to a legitimate government purpose.’
93
  
Le Grange J acknowledged that indeed there was a differentiation imposed by 
s 133 between natural and juristic persons,
94
 however, regard was had to Cloete 
Murray and Another NNO v Firstrand Bank Limited t/a Wesbank
95
 where it was held 
that: 
‘[i]t is generally accepted that a moratorium on legal proceedings against a company 
under business rescue is of cardinal importance since it provides the crucial breathing 
space or a period of respite to enable a company to restructure its affairs. This allows 
the practitioner in conjunction with creditors and other affected parties to formulate a 
business rescue plan designed to achieve the purpose of the process.’
96 
The court therefore acknowledged that s 133 served a particular purpose and 
had not been included arbitrarily. This was substantiated by the court where it linked 
the enjoyment of legal moratorium solely to juristic persons
97
 and therefore something 
which in any event could never have been relied upon by natural persons, and in 
doing so causing any alleged differentiation to be justified. 
98
 The decision in this case 
makes good sense because the very nature of business rescue proceedings is such that 
they are to be relied upon by financially distressed companies, the purpose of which is 
to rescue the business of an entity and to afford that entity temporary protection of its 
business. 
 Pioneer Foods 
A full bench of appeal
99
 in the case of Tuna v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Limited
100
 
was tasked with determining whether the legal moratorium in s 133 extended 
protection to the surety concerned. A deed of suretyship had been executed in favour 
of the respondent for the obligations of a financially distressed close corporation 
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which had been placed under business rescue.
101
 Summary judgment was awarded 
against the appellant who sought, and was granted, leave to appeal to the full bench. 
In my view, it is surprising that the court granted leave to appeal given that it had 
been established in Bruyns
102
 that the legal moratorium does not extend to the benefit 
of a third party surety. 
The court recited and placed reliance on the provisions of African Bank 





 and held that s 133 is directed exclusively at protecting the 
financially distressed company’s interests and did not affect a surety’s indebtedness 
during business rescue proceedings. In addition to this, and among other things, 
reliance was placed on Voet
105
 where it was recorded that ‘[n]evertheless [the] 
suretyship does not disappear if the goods of the debtor have been confiscated, or 
have been transferred to his creditors by the benefit of surrender, or of if a written 
order for a stay of payment has been obtained by the debtor.’ The appeal in Pioneer 
Foods
106
 was dismissed by way of unanimous decision. It is therefore clear that the 
only circumstances under which a surety will be released from its obligation is where 
there has been an absolute release between the principal debtor and its creditors. The 
notion of an ‘absolute release’ is further discussed in the case of Tuning Fork
107
 in 4.3 
below. 
 Zevoli 
The recent case of Nedbank Limited v Zevoli 208 (Pty) Ltd and Others
108
 also 
warrants brief discussion. In this case the plaintiff creditor had concluded a loan 
agreement with a company and sought to recover its debts against several defendant 
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sureties who had each stood as surety and co-principal debtor for the company’s 
obligations to the creditor.
109
 The company had resolved in terms of s 129 to be 
placed under business rescue supervision and the creditor sought to exercise recourse 
against the sureties.
110
 Over several defences were advocated by the defendants, 
however for purposes of this research paper the focus will centre on the first defence 
voiced, namely that the creditor was precluded from proceeding against the sureties 
given the legal moratorium specified in s 133. Madondo DJP reiterated the comments 
of Ponna AJ in the case of Dessert Star Trading 145 (Pty) v No 11 Flamboyant 
Edleen CC and Another
111
 that ‘[i]t is well settled that the general rule is that a surety 
may avail himself or herself of any defences that the principal debtor has, save for 
those defences that are purely personal to the principal debtor.’
112
 Against this 





and ruled that the liability of the sureties had not been affected given that they could 
not rely on the legal moratorium as such reliance was only available and personal to a 




The aforementioned series of cases make it unquestionably clear that the legal 
moratorium in s 133(1) does not operate for the benefit of third party sureties and 
creditors are within their rights to proceed with legal proceedings against such sureties 
during business rescue. 
 
4.3. CREDITORS’ RIGHTS AFTER BUSINESS RESCUE PLAN 
The cases discussed under this 4.3 focus on whether a creditor loses its claim 
against a surety if a duly adopted and implemented business rescue plan provides for 
the creditor’s claim against the principal debtor to be compromised in full and final 
settlement of such claim. 
Tuning Fork 
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Issues concerning creditors’ rights against sureties where a financially 
distressed company had been placed under business rescue were once again before 
Rogers J in the matter of Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greeff and 
Another.
116
 The central issue to be determined by the court in this case was whether 
the creditor concerned lost its claim against the surety subsequent to the adoption and 
implementation of a business rescue plan as consequence of the plan providing that 
the creditor’s claim against the principal debtor was compromised. Significantly in 
this case, neither the business rescue plan nor the deed of suretyship preserved the 
plaintiff creditor’s claim against the defendant sureties.
117
 Significantly and given my 
views adopted later on in this research paper advocating support for the reasoning by 
Roger J in this case, I point out that an extensive analysis of this case was undertaken 
as well as of the case law relied upon therein by Rogers J. 
In this case, the defendants, in their capacities as directors of the financially 
distressed company, had signed unlimited suretyships for the company’s debts, 
present and future, in favour of the plaintiff. The company was placed under business 
rescue and a business rescue plan was adopted.
118
 It was expressly provided for in the 
business rescue plan that ‘[s]hould the Creditors approve the Business Rescue Plan, 
the payment under the Business Rescue Plan to them [being the Creditors] will be in 
full and final settlement of their claims against the Company…’
119
 
Interestingly and in making its decision, the court first turned to draw a 
comparison between business rescue proceedings and compromising of debts with 
creditors. It is important to highlight the distinction in procedure and legal 
consequence between business rescue proceedings, regulated between s 128 to s 154, 
and that of compromising debts with creditors which is regulated under s 155.
120
 The 
court highlighted, among other things, several differences between compromise of 
debts under the new Companies Act and the Old Companies Act, however, particular 
consideration was afforded to s 155(9).
121
 This section of the Companies Act, unlike 
the sections regulating business rescue, expressly states that ‘[a]n arrangement or a 
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compromise contemplated in this section
122
 does not affect the liability any person 
who is a surety of the company.’ One appreciates why the court made reference to s 
155(9) in this instance given that in circumstances of compromise the legislature 
sought to expressly preserve creditors’ interests, however, failed to expressly afford 
the same protection in any of the sections between s 128 to s 154. 
The court stated that subsequent to the adoption of a business rescue plan in 
this case, the legal moratorium was superseded by the adoption of the plan as a 
consequence of the financially distressed company’s release against payment to 
creditors in full and final settlement of their claims.
123
 It was acknowledged by the 
court that the Companies Act simply does not regulate creditors’ rights against third 
party sureties subsequent to the adoption of a business rescue plan
124
 and, in the 
absence of such statutory regulation, the position therefore falls to be regulated by the 
common law.
125
 The sections of the Companies Act regulating business rescue, unlike 
the section administering compromise of debts, do not expressly preserve creditors’ 
rights against sureties.
126
 Rogers J took cognisance of the decision of Corbett AJ, as 
he was then, in Rennie NO v Gordon and Another NNO
127
 where it was held in 
agreement by Rogers J that one cannot simply read words into statute to ascertain 
what is meant, the only basis upon which one could so being that without the reading 
in of such words the statute would be unworkable.
128
  
Applying the common law of suretyships, as well noting the glaring statutory 
absence in preservation of creditors’ rights against third party sureties, Rogers J held 
that where there has been a compromise of the debt between the principal debtor and 
its creditors in the adoption of a business rescue plan, third party sureties would, in 
turn, be released from their obligations.
129
 That said, such release would be subject to 
the terms regulating the company’s release as specified in the business rescue plan 
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and furthermore subject to the application of the common law principles of 
suretyship.
130
 In my view, Rogers J’s application of the common law principles of 
suretyships is a logical conclusion. This is so because the business rescue plan is 
ultimately a compromise between the principal debtor and its creditors and 
determining creditors’ rights against sureties after the adoption of the plan would fall 
to be regulated by the law of suretyships. 
In making a determination in this case, Rogers J’s reasoning was substantiated 
following his consideration of the rational adopted by Dove Wilson in Wides v 
Butcher and Sons
131
 where it was held that the extinction of the principal obligation 
extinguishes the obligation of a surety where the principal debt is discharged by 
settlement or is extinguished by prescription. Briefly, the facts of Wides
132
 entailed a 
principal debtor assigning her estate to her creditors in terms of the Natal Insolvency 
Act of 1887, however, a particular creditor introduced a proviso into the deed of 
assignment whereby it reserved its rights of recourse against third party sureties.
133
 
The case of Wides
134
 is of significance given that it states what constitutes an absolute 
discharge and how this is linked to compromise of debts. 
The court in Wides
135
 explored whether the proviso in the deed of assignment, 
which sought to preserve the creditor’s claim against the surety, constituted an 
absolute release, or whether it was simply an undertaking not to institute action 
against the principal debtor. Neatly put in this case, an absolute discharge was 
described as one whereby the creditor forfeits their right against both the principal 
debtor as well as the surety. Following this I therefore understand that a discharge is 
not absolute where a creditor agrees not to sue the principal debtor but reserves the 
right to claim against the surety given that in such circumstances the surety would 
preserve its right of recourse to lay claim against the principal debtor for any amount 
claimed against it by the creditor. This is crucial because the common law as per 
Wides
136
 entails that where creditors have preserved their rights against a third party 
surety then the discharge is not an absolute release, but rather that the creditor’s claim 
against the principal debtor is circumvented to the surety who can, in turn, claim 
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recourse against the principal debtor. No such right of recourse exists where the 
discharge is absolute given that, on the one hand, the creditor cannot proceed against 
the principal debtor and, on the other hand and as consequence of this, the surety will 
not have a right of recourse as the creditor would not be able to proceed against the 
surety following its release. This is supported by Dove Wilson J where he stated that: 
‘There is no doubt that a simple discharge of a debtor by a creditor discharges also 
the surety, upon the simple ground that if it were otherwise, it would be a fraud upon 
the debtor, to profess to discharge him of the debt due to the creditor, and at the same 
time to leave him open to recourse against him by the surety. But a discharge of the 
debtor does not liberate the surety if the remedy against the surety is expressly 
reserved, because in that case the discharge is not an absolute release, but is merely a 
pactum de non petendo. The reservation has the effect, because it rebuts the 
presumption which ordinarily exists that if you liberate the principal debtor, you mean 
to liberate also the surety, and it has the effect of preserving the right of recourse by 
the surety against the principal debtor. The test whether or not the discharge which 
has been given is absolute, or merely a covenant not to sue, is whether the debtor is, 
after the discharge, put in the position of being able to say to the creditor that “It is 
inconsistent with the discharge which has been given to him that there should be any 
right of recourse against him by the surety.” If the debtor is not in a position to say so, 









 which was decided by a strong majority of the Appellate 
Division.
140
 This case focused on the issue as to whether a release by the principal 
debtor, pursuant to a statutory assignment under the Insolvency Act,
141
 preserved a 
creditor’s claim against a surety.
142
 One can appreciate why Rogers J chose to rely on 
the decision in Moti
143
 given that although the Old Insolvency Act, like the 
Companies Act
144
 and the Insolvency Act, did preserve creditors’ rights against 
sureties in circumstances of compromise and rehabilitation, the Old Insolvency Act 
was silent on such rights where there had been a statutory assignment.
145
 Wessels J in 
Moti
146
 neatly summarised the position in his majority judgment by stating as follows: 
‘Now if by the common law the debtor is discharged form a debt or from all his debts 
the surety is released. If in the case of assignment the creditors agree with the debtor 
                                                          
137
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that they will be satisfied with his assignment and will take these in full settlement 
then they discharge the debtor from all obligation to pay them the difference between 
the amount of the debts and the value of the assets.  
Of this discharge the surety is by our law entitled to take advantage.  
Now the fact that the Legislature has altered the common law in the case of 
rehabilitation and composition and clearly enacted that the sureties are to remain 
liable, and the fact that in the case of assignment under Chapter 6 the Legislature has 
been silent as regards sureties, leads me to infer that the Legislature did not think of 
the case where sureties had bound themselves and an assignment under the Act takes 
place, and if the Legislature did not think of it, it could not have intended in such a 
case to alter the common law as regards sureties... 
It appears to me, therefore, that we have to deal here with a casus omissus and that 




In summary, it can be inferred from the decision in Tuning Fork
148
 that where 
there has been no preservation of creditors’ rights against third party sureties of 
financially distressed companies in either of the adopted business rescue plan, or in 
the deed of suretyship itself, there is then a compromise of the principal debt and the 
surety’s release is absolute in such circumstances. The notion of absolute discharge 
was highlighted by Rogers J with reference to the decision in Wides.
149
 Given the 
statutory silence on creditors preserving their rights against sureties, Rogers turned to 
the case of Moti
150
 where, in similar circumstances to those of Tuning Fork,
151
  there 
had been a compromise of the principal debt regulated by statute, however, the statute 
failed to expressly state how this would affect the creditors’ rights against sureties in 
certain circumstances. Given the similarities in statutory absence and circumstances, 
the common law was applied in Moti
152
 where it was, in my view, correctly held that 
in the absence of statutory regulation, creditors would lose their rights against sureties 
in circumstances of compromise. 
 Du Toit 
In another decision handed down by the Western Cape Division, the court in 
ABSA Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others
153
 was tasked with exploring the liability of 
defendants under suretyships which they had executed in favour of the plaintiff for 
obligations of a financially distressed arising from, among other things, a mortgage 
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loan agreement and term loan agreement.
154
 A business rescue plan had been 
adopted
155
 and the defendants raised the defence that their liability had been 
extinguished as a consequence of the business rescue plan and reliance was placed on 
s 154(2).
156
 It was alleged by the plaintiff that the business rescue plan made 
provision
157
 that the implementation thereof would ‘…not affect any rights that any 




Counsel for the defendant argued that liability under the suretyships was 
contingent on the existence of a principal debt and, in the absence of such debt 
through circumstances of compromise, the accessory obligation imposed on the 
defendant sureties would cease to exist.
159
 It was further advocated that 
notwithstanding any preservation of creditors’ claims against sureties contained in the 
business rescue plan, such claims could not be enforced when having regard to the 
provisions of s 154(2). It was argued for the plaintiff that the terms of the 
suretyships
160
 and business rescue plan preserved the plaintiff’s claim against the 
defendants and therefore the claim had not been extinguished.
161
  
In making its determination, the court had regard to the decision in African 
Bank Corporation,
162
 where Kathree-Setiloane J held that it would be drastic had it 
been in the contemplation of the legislature to deprive creditors of their rights’ against 
third party sureties and, if it had been intended to be so, the legislature would have 
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otherwise expressly made provision for this.
163
 Surprisingly in my view, Saldanha J 
disregarded the plaintiff’s argument and favoured the defendants’ argument on the 
basis that the facts in Du Toit
164
 were distinguishable in so far as reliance was placed 
on s 154.
165
 The court refused to grant summary judgment on the basis that a bona 
fide defence had been raised by the defendants.  
In my view and taking into consideration the application of the common law 
principles to the law suretyships, as well as the commentary of Rogers J in Tuning 
Fork,
166
 the court erred in its decision in ruling by ruling against the plaintiff. The 
defence raised against the enforcement of the suretyships was one of law and 
Saldanha J’s decision entailed that regardless of the provisions of the business rescue 
plan, or those of suretyships, the adoption of the business rescue plan had the effect of 
releasing sureties from their obligations to creditors. Interestingly, this decision was 
blatantly ignored in Tuning Fork.
167
 That said, it can be argued that the case of Tuning 
Fork
168
 posed different facts on the basis that neither the business rescue plan nor the 
deed of suretyships sought to preserve creditors’ rights against third part sureties in 
circumstances where there had been a compromise of the principal debt. Interestingly 
and correctly in my view, on materially similar facts to those of Du Toit
169
 a different 
conclusion was arrived at by Bozalek J in ABSA Bank Limited v Haremza
170
 which is 
further discussed in 4.5 below. 
 New Port 
Almost a year later following the decision in Tuning Fork,
171
 a unanimous 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal was delivered by Wallis J in the case of New 
Port Finance Company (Pty) & Another v Nedbank Limited.
172
 In this case, deeds of 
suretyships had been executed by the defendants in favour of Nedbank, as the 
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plaintiff, for the obligations of two companies to the bank arising from money 
borrowed. Notwithstanding that the entities for whom the defendants had stood surety 
were placed under final liquidation, these entities were taken out of liquidation, placed 
under business rescue and a business rescue plan was subsequently adopted.
173
  
Similarly to the decision in Du Toit,
174
 it was argued by the defendants that the 
adoption and implementation of the business rescue plan had the effect of discharging 
them from their obligations as sureties.
175
 Turning focus to the provisions of the 
executed suretyships, the court noted that the terms of the deed of suretyship made 
provision for the bank to claim from the sureties notwithstanding any dealings with 
the principal debtor, the grant of any extension of time, or any compromise in relation 
to the scope and extent of the principal debtor’s indebtedness to the bank creditor. 
176
 
Defendant’s counsel’s failure to advocate a defence based on the legal 
moratorium contained in s 133 was met with approval by Wallis J. The court also held 
that the defendants had not gone so far as to argue that s 128 to s 154 altered the 
application of the common law of suretyships and creditors’ rights against sureties.
177
 
Although reliance was placed by the defendants on the decision in Tuning Fork,
178
 the 
court in obiter mentioned that the reasoning of Rogers J was, in the view of Wallis J, 
by no means clear to him to be correct. The court’s view was based on the fact that 
Tuning Fork’s
179
 reliance on Moti
180
 was misplaced given that the latter case focused 
on provisions in the Old Insolvency Act for which there was no direct counterpart in 
the new Companies Act. Wallis J provided an interesting interpretation when 
considering the implications of s 154 (which section was considered crucial in 
Saldanha J’s decision in Du Toit)
181
 stating that the provisions apply to a discharge of 
the debt between a financially distressed company and its creditors. Therefore and in 
other words, the provisions of s 154 find application only to the relationship between 
a company and its creditors, not creditors and third party sureties. Following this 
logic, the court in New Port
182
 held that the liability of third party sureties would 
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therefore remain unaffected save to the extent that the provisions of the business 




4.4. REFLECTION: TUNING FORK AND NEW PORT 
Pausing to take stock of the decision in New Port,
184
 it is clear the court 
adopted the view that notwithstanding the adoption of a business rescue plan by 
creditors of a financially distressed company, this did not compromise creditors’ 
claims against third party sureties where the deeds of suretyship expressly preserved 
such rights. It is therefore unclear why, on the one hand, Wallis J’s comment in obiter 
was made regarding the correctness of the judgment in Tuning Fork
185
 and, on the 
other hand, why he remarked that ‘…the liability of the surety would be unaffected by 




Turning to address the first of these comments, it is the contention of this 
research paper that the reasoning of Rogers J in Tuning Fork
187
 was indeed correct. 
The court, similarly to that in the case of Moti,
188
 was tasked with addressing a 
situation for which no answer could be derived from statute at the time. Although 
there was no direct counterpart in the Old Insolvency Act to the Companies Act, it is 
challenging to argue against the comparison which was drawn by Rogers J in reaching 
his determination. Rogers J sought to portray a circumstance whereby under the Old 
Insolvency Act creditors’ rights were preserved against sureties in circumstances of 
compromise and rehabilitation, however the very same Act was silent on such rights 
where there had been a statutory assignment.
189
 In such absence, the common law 
prevailed and given that the suretyships did not expressly preserve their rights in 
circumstances of compromise,
190
 it is challenging to advocate that the reasoning 
underlying the release of the sureties in the case of Tuning Fork
191
 was incorrect. 
Turning to address the second of these comments and in my view, Wallis J’s 
remarks that a suretyship would remain unaffected by business rescue save for where 
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the business rescue plan provides otherwise gives rise to confusion. In the sentences 
preceding these comments it was highlighted that Wallis J contemplates that s 154 
only finds application between a financially distressed company and its creditors. In 
applying the common law principles of suretyships where the suretyships specifically 
preserve creditors’ rights in circumstances subsequent to the adoption of a business 
rescue plan, surely such suretyships must be prevail notwithstanding the terms of any 
adopted and implemented business rescue plan. If so, why would Wallis J state that 
this is the case ‘unless the plan itself made specific provision for the situation of 
sureties?’
192
 As was clearly highlighted by Rogers J, the Companies Act simply does 
not address what the position of third party sureties is pursuant to the adoption of a 
business rescue plan.
193
 Therefore the position in such circumstances must be 
administered by the common law and in this regard it has been established that 
creditors retain their rights against sureties notwithstanding the adoption and 
implementation of a business rescue plan, subject to the terms of the deed of 
suretyship. 
Another view to be adopted is that Wallis J’s comment in obiter was intended 
to refer to the fact that Rogers J was wrong to place reliance on the common law 
application of suretyships. Simply put and in Wallis J’s view, one need only consider 
the provisions of s 154 of the Companies Act, which section is only of application 
between a principal debtor and its creditors, not the surety. Having said all of this, 
although it is appreciated that the ultimate decision in New Port
194
 is correct, there 
remain several unanswered issues.  
In applying the law of suretyships as set out by Rogers J in Tuning Fork,
195
 I 
agree with Wallis J’s remark that a creditor can enforce its claims against a third party 
of an entity in business rescue where there has been a preservation of such rights in 
the deed of suretyship.
196
 This does not, however, address why Wallis J went on to 
comment that ‘…the liability of the surety would be unaffected by the business 
rescue, unless the plan itself made specific provision for situation of surety.’
197
 Does 
this mean that where a business rescue plan grants the release of a surety that this has 
the potential to discharge such surety’s liability? This would be directly contrary to 
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what has just been explained whereby deeds of suretyship expressly preserve rights in 
such circumstances.  
In light of Wallis J’s remark, thought is to be afforded to what should transpire 
where a minority creditor has a suretyship in its favour, it votes against the adoption 
of a business rescue plan (which specifically caters for the release of the minority 
creditor’s surety) and such plan is overwhelmingly voted in favour of and adopted by 
the majority of creditors. Can the adoption of a business rescue plan be challenged 
where it has been voted in favour of by the majority of creditors and releases a 
minority creditor’s surety? Surely a business rescue plan cannot unilaterally change 
and affect personal rights of parties in a surety relationship and this may be an issue 
which our South African company law may need specifically address. A resolution to 
this is considered in chapter 7 below.  
 
4.5. RECENT CASE LAW ON BUSINESS RESCUE 
This 4.5 further explores recent decisions in respect of business rescue 
proceedings, with a central focus being on creditors’ rights against sureties. 
 Haremza 
In the case of Haremza
198
 the court was once again tasked with determining 
the liability of a defendant who had stood surety for the debts of a financially 
distressed company which had been placed under business rescue. The facts in this 
case were materially similar to that of Du Toit,
199
 whereby the company for which the 
defendant stood surety had concluded a finance document with the plaintiff and had 
failed to discharge its obligations and was subsequently placed under business rescue 
and, pursuant to this, a business rescue plan
200
 was adopted and implemented.
201
  
Similarly to the decision in New Port,
202
 the surety’s defence centred on the 
accessory nature of suretyships and that the adoption of the business rescue plan 
resulted in the extinction of the principal debt.
203
 No small part of reliance was placed 
by the surety on the decision of Tuning Fork,
204
 however, Bozalek J was conscious of 
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Rogers J’s comments that notwithstanding that the adoption of a business rescue plan 
is a compromise between a principal debtor and its creditor, such compromise only 
affects creditors’ claims against sureties where the deeds of suretyship are absent 
provisions specifically preserving such rights.
205
 Although there was a mere 
acknowledgment of Wallis J’s comment
206
 in New Port,
207
 the court in Haremza
208
 
expressed the view that it was obliged to follow the reasoning of the court in Tuning 
Fork
209
 and held that notwithstanding the compromise reached between the 
financially distressed company and the plaintiff, such compromise did not discharge 
the obligations of the defendant surety having regard to the preservation of the 
plaintiff creditor’s rights in the deed of suretyship and/or the business rescue plan.
210
 
Therefore and especially having regard to the provisions of the business rescue plan in 
this case, clearly it was intended that any discharge between the debtor would not 
constitute an absolute release given that the plaintiff’s rights against the surety were 
not forfeited.
211
 Bozalek J, surprisingly, did not place reliance on the decision in New 
Port,
212
 where the facts were materially similar, but rather sought to place greater 
reliance on the judgment of Rogers J in Tuning Fork.
213
 
It is interesting that the decision of Du Toit,
214
 which contained carbon copy 
provisions of the business rescue plan and deed of suretyship and wherein summary 
judgment was refused, was not even mentioned or relied upon by the court in 
Haremza.
215
 In my opinion, Bozalek J applied the law correctly in this case as no 
compromise could have been agreed in light of the business rescue plan and deed of 
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4.6. BUSINESS RESCUE AND GUARANTEES 
The consequences of the legal moratorium once again recently fell before the 
court in the summary judgment application of Sapor Rentals (Pty) Limited v Tayob.
216
 
Unlike focusing on the impact of suretyships, the central issue focused on the 
enforceability of a continuing guarantee executed by a respondent guarantor for the 
principal debtor’s obligations to the applicant.
217
 The terms of the business rescue 
plan had not been specified in any of the papers before the court and the court was 
therefore unable to determine whether the obligations of the principal debtor had been 
discharged which, in turn, may have had some bearing on the respondent guarantor’s 
liability to the applicant creditor. The court stated that it was reluctant to place 
reliance on the decision in Tuning Fork
218
 given that a deed of suretyship, not a 
guarantee, was the subject of debate in that case.
219
 This notwithstanding, the court 
held that the Companies Act did not expressly preclude any action from being taken, 
or stayed, against a guarantor where a financially distressed company was placed 
under business rescue. It was on this basis that the court rejected the respondent 
guarantor’s argument that the legal moratorium was to be extended to its benefit.
220
 
Although in my view the decision of the court in Sapor Rentals
221
 is ultimately 
correct, one cannot help but consider whether Ratshibvumo AJ’s reasoning was 
correct. Based on the preceding decisions already discussed, it is clear that the legal 
moratorium in s 133 is not equally enjoyed by a third party surety, however, the 
reason for not extending the benefit to a guarantor is not because the Companies Act 
fails to expressly exclude this as was stated by the court in Sapor Rentals.
222
  
There are several distinctions which are to be drawn between a suretyship and 
a guarantee which were highlighted in the case of List v Jungers.
223
 A guarantor 
guarantees a certain event, for example against registration of transfer of a property 
into the name of a purchaser it will pay out, and is responsible for indemnifying the 
creditor against any non-performance by the debtor. On other hand a surety is only 
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liable where there has been a breach of contract by the debtor. The key distinction is 
therefore that, unlike a suretyship where the obligation is accessory in nature, the 
obligation under a guarantee is principal and a guarantor is obliged to pay in the event 
of certain circumstances transpiring, whereas a surety is an undertaking whereby, 
first, a debtor is required to perform and secondly, only pursuant to a failure to 
perform will recourse be had against the surety.
224
   
Therefore, where an independent guarantee has been furnished for the 
obligations of a principal debtor to its creditor, and notwithstanding any compromise 
between the aforementioned parties, the guarantee establishes a principal obligation 
upon which a creditor can rely upon and proceed against the guarantor. Unlike a deed 
of suretyship, a guarantee is not dependent on the existence of a underlying principal 
debt and therefore creditors’ rights would be preserved by the issue of such a 
guarantee. It is for the foregoing reasons that creditors’ rights against guarantors 
should not be circumvented in circumstances of business rescue proceedings and it 
should have been on this basis that the decision in Sapor Rentals
225
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5. CHAPTER 5: THE NATURE OF REORGANISATION PROCEEDINGS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  





Similarly to chapter 2 above, the purpose of this chapter 5 is to provide a high-level 
legal introduction and legal analysis on the Bankruptcy Codes
228
 which find 
application within the jurisdiction of the United States of America. This chapter also 
sets the foundation for the analysis of case law in chapter 6 and the comparative law 
analysis in chapter 7 below. 
The South African legislature consulted the Bankruptcy Codes when 
populating chapter 6 of the Companies Act’s business rescue provisions given the 
numerous jurisdictions which have incorporated the Bankruptcy Codes processes and 
provisions.
229
 It is for this reason, and given the material similarities between the 
Companies Act chapter 6 and chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Codes, that a review of 
American jurisprudence is undertaken in order to ascertain what creditors’ rights are 
against non-debtors where a non-consensual reorganisation plan seeks to release such 
non-debtors and how this compares to the legal position adopted in South Africa. 
Having said this, s 5(2) of the Companies Act provides that our South African courts 
may consider foreign company law to assist them in making informed decisions.
230
 
That said and as will appear in particular from a review of American case law in 
chapter 6 and the comparative analysis conducted in chapter 7 below, caution should 
be exercised in placing too much reliance on American jurisprudence. 
This chapter will focus, in brief, first on the statutory framework in which the 
Bankruptcy Codes find application. Secondly, the general principles underlying what 
the reorganisation process seeks to achieve will be discussed. Thereafter, the 
commencement and termination of reorganisation proceedings, the application of the 
automatic stay during such proceedings and, significantly, the confirmation of the 
reorganisation plan will be discussed. 
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5.2. FRAMEWORK OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODES 
The Bankruptcy Codes consist of 9 chapters.
231
 The first three chapters find 





 whilst the general rules of administration are 
contained in the remaining chapters and apply throughout the Code.
234
 For purposes 
of this research paper, particular consideration is afforded to chapter 11 of the Codes 
which sets out the statutory framework and principles applicable to reorganisations of 
bankrupt entities.  
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
235
 govern proceedings within a 
bankruptcy case, whilst the Codes regulate the rights and procedures of such cases.
236
 
There is a close interaction between the Code and the Rules such as, on the one hand, 
s 501 and s 502 of the Code which require that a creditor file a proof of claim and, on 





5.3. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE REORGANISATION PROCESS 
There are three overarching principles which underlie the reorganisation 
process which is regulated under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Codes.
238
 The first is to 
afford a debtor an opportunity to regather itself by evaluating and taking stock of the 
financial position of its business whilst simultaneously prohibiting any creditors of the 
debtor from taking any action against it. In this regard and forthwith after the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition for its reorganisation, this is accomplished by imposing an 
‘automatic stay.’
239
 Creditors are therefore prohibited from taking any action, 
including the enforcement of any debt or seizure of any property of the debtor, and 
this therefore affords the debtor the breathing space it requires to take a step back, re-
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evaluate its position and make decisions as to what would be in not only in its best 
interest, but also the interests of its creditors and other stakeholders.
240
 The ‘automatic 
stay’ is further discussed in 5.5 below. 
The second principle underlying the reorganisation process is that it is 
intended to lead to a ratable sharing of assets among creditors of a similar class.
241
 
The term ‘ratable distribution to creditors’ simply implies that reorganisation seeks to 
achieve an orderly and equitable sharing of a debtor’s existing assets by its creditors. 
The ratable distribution is in accordance with a prescribed formula outlined in the 
Code.
242
 Therefore, reorganisation is driven to ensure that, as near as may be possible, 
creditors receive a better return than that which would they would otherwise have 
received on the liquidation of the debtor.  
The third and final principle underlying the reorganisation process is that it 
aims to provide a mechanism to a debtor whereby it can discharge its debts which 
arose prior to the filing of the reorganisation petition and continue trading under a 
‘fresh start.’
243
 This is accomplished by a court confirming a reorganisation plan 
which has been voted on by creditors, such plan being implemented and distributions 
being ratably made to a debtor’s creditors.
244
 Significantly, not all discharge of debt is 
absolute. For example, should a debtor have misrepresented, or concealed, 
information in the reorganisation plan, a creditor can apply to have the debt declared 
non-dischargeable.
245
 In addition to this, the Code expressly specifies in s 523(a)(1) 
that, among other things, tax and customs duty will not be discharged and a debtor 
will continue to remain accountable for this.  
 
5.4. COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION 
 Commencement 
 A debtor may either be placed under reorganisation voluntarily or 
involuntarily. In the former circumstance, reorganisation commences subsequent to 
the filing of reorganisation petition, consisting of the filling out and filing of a short, 












 s 523(a)(2). 
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standard form by the debtor with a bankruptcy court.
246
 Together with the filing of the 
reorganisation petition, a debtor must also file a schedule of its assets and liabilities, a 
statement detailing record of its financial affairs and a schedule setting out its current 
income and expenditure.
247
 In the latter circumstance, and depending on the number 
of creditors,
248
 bankruptcy also commences subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition, comprising of materially similar documentation as in the case of a voluntary 
petition, save that the required documentation is populated by the debtor’s creditors. 
Subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy petition and forthwith from the date on which 
such petition is filed, a bankruptcy ‘estate’
249
 is constituted in terms of s  541.
250
 The 
‘estate’ comprises of all of the debtor’s interest in property, or the proceeds, products, 




Debtor in possession and appointment of a trustee 
 Under the Bankruptcy Codes the debtor remains in possession of its business 
and exercises control over its assets and business after the filing of the petition.
252
 For 
all intents and purposes, the debtor retains control and operation of its business, its 
day to day administration and regulation of finances.
253
 That said, the debtor is said 
not to be ‘in possession’ where there has been an appointment of a trustee or where 
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reorganisation proceedings have been converted to liquidation proceedings.
254
 The 
trustee is a representative of the debtor’s estate.
255
  
 Following the commencement of the reorganisation, but before confirmation 
of a reorganisation plan, a bankruptcy court may order the appointment of a trustee at 
any time on request of an interested party or the United States trustee,
 256
 and after 
notice and a hearing.
257
 The trustee is appointed where there has been, among other 
things, any fraud or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by its current 
management, either before or after the commencement of the reorganisation case, or 
similar cause,
258
 or if such an appointment would be in the best interest of creditors as 
well as the debtor’s estate.
259
 The powers of the trustee, if appointed, are 
comprehensively set out in s 1106, including being accountable for any property 
received, examining any proofs of claims submitted and providing interested parties, 
such as creditors, with information of the debtor’s estate.
260
 Where a trustee is not 
appointed, and the debtor remains in possession of the estate, the debtor has, save for 
certain exceptions,
261
 the powers, duties and functions of a trustee as set forth in 
s 1106.
262
 Both debtor and trustee are empowered, in terms of s 1108, to operate the 
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 In my view, it would appear that a debtor has the right to unilaterally terminate 
reorganisation proceedings. That said, a debtor cannot exercise such right where it is 
not in possession (in other words a trustee has been appointed),
 263
 where creditors 
have applied for the reorganisation of the debtor
264
 or where the debtor was placed 
under reorganisation other than of its own volition.
265
 In addition to the foregoing, on 
request of an interested party, and after hearing and notice, a court may convert 
reorganisation proceedings to liquidation proceedings under chapter 7, where such 
conversion is in the best interests of a debtor’s creditors and its estate.
266
 In terms of 
s 305, a court may dismiss a reorganisation process, or suspend all proceedings under 
such process, if at any time such dismissal or suspension would be in the interest of 
both a debtor and its creditors.
267
 Finally, the reorganisation process can also be 
terminated subsequent to the administration of the estate, in accordance with the 




5.5. THE AUTOMATIC STAY  
In terms of s 326(a), an ‘automatic stay’ is immediately imposed on the 
property of the estate of a debtor company against all creditors on the filing of the 
reorganisation petition. This materially amounts to, for all intents and purposes, the 
legal moratorium embedded in s 133(1) of the Companies Act. The court in St Paul 
Fir and Marine Ins. Co. v Labuzan
269
 remarked that: 
‘The automatic stay is one of the fundamental protections provided by the bankruptcy 
laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection 
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt 
repayment or reorganisation plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures 
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 The automatic stay finds application in all circumstances specified in 
s  362(a)
271
 and, similarly to business rescue proceedings in South Africa, finds 
application regardless of whether such proceedings have been commenced by a debtor 
or by its creditors.
272
 Having said this, a party may apply to a court to have the 
automatic stay lifted in terms of s 362(d).
273
 The automatic stay is further discussed in 
case law in 6.2 below. 
 
5.6. THE REORGANISATION PLAN 
Meeting of creditors and constitution of creditors’ committee 
Following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a meeting of creditors is 
scheduled by the debtor’s trustee where one has been appointed, or by the United 
States trustee.
274
 Although creditors may attend the meeting, their participation is 
limited as the examination of the debtor is conducted by the trustee. In this regard, the 
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debtor is questioned on, among other things, its on-going insurance coverage, its 
financial records and the profitability of its continued business operations. Creditors 
are generally permitted to raise queries as to whether the debtor has committed 
bankruptcy fraud which would, in turn, affect its right to discharge its debts, an 
example of this being having concealed certain assets which it did not otherwise 
specify in its petition for bankruptcy. No substantive ruling or decisions are made at 
the meeting, the purpose simply being organisational and informational. That said, 
and although not expressly stated in the Bankruptcy Codes at s 341, informally a 




A creditors’ committee is appointed as soon as may be practical after a debtor 
has filed for bankruptcy. As mentioned, this committee is generally constituted at the 
first meeting of creditors and is appointed by the trustee or the United States trustee, 
as the case may be.
276
 The creditors’ committee assists with providing information to 
other creditors who hold claims against the debtor’s estate and who have not been 
appointed to such a committee.
277
 The power and duties of the creditors’ committee 
are more fully set out in s 1103 and include consulting with the trustee or debtor in 
possession concerning the administration of the case,
278
 investigating the assets, 
liabilities and financial position of the debtor
279
 and, significantly, participate in the 
formulation of the reorganisation plan.
280
 
The reorganisation plan 
In terms of s 1121, a debtor is afforded a 120 day exclusivity period, routinely 
extended to 180 days, in terms of which it has the exclusive right to populate and 
propose a plan of reorganisation. If a trustee replaces the debtor in possession, the 
exclusivity immediately terminates and any creditor, or the debtor, may propose a 
plan.
281
 The content of the reorganisation plan is comprehensively detailed in s 1123 
and must include, among other things, all claims against the debtor’s estate
282
 and the 
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manner in which it is proposed that the plan will be implemented.
283
 Before the plan is 
put to a vote by creditors, the debtor is required to submit a disclosure statement to the 
court which is, to a large extent, a repetition of the terms of the plan.
284
 For all intents 
and purposes, the disclosure statement must detail sufficient information in respect of 
the debtor’s assets, liabilities and business affairs such that the creditors who will vote 
on the reorganisation plan are in a position to make an informed decision.
285
 
In terms of s 1126 ‘at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in 
number of the allowed claims in such class’ are required to accept the plan. If the plan 
is accepted by creditors it is then placed before the bankruptcy court for confirmation 
in terms of s 1128 and s 1129 respectively. s 1129, in particular, comprehensively 
details over several requirements which a court is to take into account when 
confirming a plan and, significantly, the plan is only adopted once confirmed by a 
court. The binding effect between a debtor and its creditors subsequent to the 
confirmation of the plan is specified in s 1141(a) and (d)(1) which respectively state 
that: 
‘s 1141(a) - except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the 
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the 
plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor, equity security 
holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim or interest of such 
creditor, equity security holder, or general partner is impaired under the plan and 
whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner has accepted 
the plan.’ 
 
‘s 1141(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the 
order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan— 
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such 
confirmation…’ 
The provisions of s 1141 are clear that, save for certain exceptions,
286
 a 
confirmed reorganisation plan is binding on, among others, a debtor and its creditor. It 
is at this stage of the reorganisation process, the confirmation of the plan, that a 
discord has been struck between various courts of the United States of America, 
particularly where courts have been requested to confirm non-consensual 
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reorganisation plans. In this regard and turning to afford consideration to the legal 
consequences of the confirmation of a plan, consideration is afforded to s 524(e) of 
chapter 11 of the Code which states that a ‘…discharge of a debt of the debtor does 
not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, 
such debt.’ It has been advocated however that this can be outweighed by placing 
reliance on s 105 which affords courts broad equitable powers by stating that: 
‘[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the 
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, 
sua sponte,
287
 taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate 
to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.’ 
The interplay between these two sections is heavily disputed in the circuit courts of 
the United States of America in circumstances where confirmation of a non-
consensual reorganisation plan is sought. This is because s 524 clearly specifies that a 
discharge of debt, as contemplated in s 1141(d)(1), does not release a third party, such 
as a surety, from its obligations, however, s 105 affords the court a discretionary 
power to potentially disregard this. This issue is further explored in chapter 6 below. 
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This chapter 6 will primarily focus on the interplay between s 524(e) and s 105(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Codes. Unlike under South African law where the position is 
currently regulated by the common law, creditors’ rights against third parties, such as 
sureties and guarantors, of bankrupt companies in the United States of America falls 
to be regulated by statute. First, this chapter examines the various courts’ 
interpretations and decisions in respect of extending the benefit of the automatic stay 
to co-debtors in terms of s 362 under chapter 11. Secondly, this chapter also explores 
whether creditors’ rights against non-debtors are preserved notwithstanding their 
release following the confirmation of a non-consensual reorganisation plan.
288
 It is 
undoubtedly clear from the cases to be discussed below that there is a divide in 
opinion between the various courts as to whether non-debtors should be released 
following the confirmation of a non-consensual reorganisation plan, or whether such a 
release can even be introduced into a plan. 
 





 chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Codes, which 
administers bankruptcy and reorganisation, fails to extend the benefit of the 
‘automatic stay’ to co-debtors.
291
 Therefore, chapters 12 and 13 expressly extend the 
benefit of the automatic stay to non-debtors whilst chapter 11 does not do so. The 
absence of such mention has been interpreted by some courts as legislative intent that 
the benefit of the automatic stay does not extend to parties other than the principal 
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 This notwithstanding however, the automatic stay has been granted by some 
courts to non-debtors under chapter 11 having regard to s 362
293
 and s 105 
respectively.
294
 That said and regardless of which section courts rely on in 
determining whether the automatic stay finds application, it is generally appreciated 
that ‘unusual circumstances’ must exist for such stay to be extended to non-debtors.
295
  
In the case of Williford v Armstrong World Industries Inc,
296
 the fourth circuit 
rejected the co-debtors’ contention that the automatic stay was to extend to their 
benefit. This case centred on a plaintiff’s claim arising from exposure to, and harm 
caused by, various asbestos products which had been manufactured by the defendants. 
During trial proceedings several of the defendants filed for bankruptcy and the 
remaining co-defendants advocated that as a result of this the automatic stay was to be 
extended to their benefit as well. The defendants alleged that all claims against the 
defendants, including those defendants which had filed for bankruptcy, were 
inextricably interwoven and the matter could not proceed without bankruptcy 
proceedings first having been concluded.
297
 This defence was rejected by the court on 
the basis that joint tortfeasors
298
 are not indispensable parties.
299
 The defendants also 
alleged that failure to extend the automatic stay would violate s 362, however, this 
was also rejected by the court on reasoning that s 362 finds application to ‘debtors’ 
only and not co-debtors.
300
 Finally, the non-debtors also raised the defence that the 
court was to exercise the discretionary powers afforded to it under s 105 to extend the 
benefit of the stay to them, however, the court ruled that the co-debtors had failed to 
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advocate sufficient grounds upon which not to enforce the stay and therefore the court 
did not extend the automatic stay.
301
  
The case of A.H. Robins Company Incorporated v Piccinin
302
 is illustrative of 
circumstances where the court did extend the automatic stay to co-debtors. The case 
centred on defective contraceptives which had been marketed and had caused 
numerous unplanned pregnancies and infertility issues. As a result of this, thousands 
of lawsuits were filed against the company concerned as well as co-defendants who 
were involved in the administration of the company. The company ultimately filed for 
bankruptcy and numerous plaintiffs sought to sever their ties with the bankrupt 
company and  to proceed against the co-defendants who were not bankrupt.
303
 The 
company filed an action against the plaintiffs seeking a determination by the court that 
its product liability policy was the property of the bankruptcy estate and that all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims against all of the defendants should be prohibited.
304
 The court 
stated that unusual circumstances arise ‘when there is such identity between the 
debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party 
defendant and that judgement against the third-party defendant will in effect be a 
judgment or finding against the debtor.’
305
 The court ruled to extend the automatic 
stay in favour of the co-debtors, placing particular reliance on s 362(a)(3), on 
reasoning that such a stay was necessitated when required to secure possession or 
exercise control over the property of the debtor.
306
 The court therefore exercised its 
discretion to extend the automatic stay in this section, notwithstanding that such stay 
is not specifically granted to co-debtors under chapter 11. 
 
6.3. INTERPLAY BETWEEN S 524(E) AND S 105(A) 
Purpose of reorganisation plan 
As discussed under 5.6 above, reorganisation proceedings culminate with the 
confirmation of a reorganisation plan by the court which amounts to, for all intents 
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and purposes, a contract between the debtor and its stakeholders.
307
 It is the intent of a 
reorganisation plan to resolve all matters affecting the bankrupt debtor, including 
resolving any indemnification claims which are brought by non-debtors where they 
have had to settle creditors’ claims on behalf of the bankrupt debtor.
308
 Therefore and 
in an attempt to provide a bankrupt debtor with a truly ‘fresh’ start, the scope of the 
reorganisation plan is expanded to include the release of non-debtors, even where 
such release is non-consensual by creditors.
309
  
As mentioned under 5.6 above, s 524(e) restricts the release of non-debtors 
following the discharge of a principal debtor under a reorganisation plan, however, 
s 105(a) affords the bankruptcy courts broad equitable powers to take such action as is 
necessary and appropriate to give effect to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Codes.
310
 
Although some courts have relied on their discretionary power in terms of s 105(a) to 
release non-debtors following the confirmation of a non-consensual reorganisation 
plan, such power and authority has been challenged by other courts on the basis that it 
is prohibited by the provisions of s 524(e). The interplay between these two sections is 
of particular importance when determining whether a non-consensual reorganisation 
plan, which seeks to release a non-debtor from liability, is valid. The interplay 
between these two sections is examined below in the context of releasing non-debtors 
from their security instruments following the confirmation of a reorganisation plan 
notwithstanding the express mandate of s 524(e). 
 Terminology of s 524(e) and s 105(a) 
The starting point of consideration is the wording expressed in both of s 524(e) 
and s 105(a). It is clear from the language stated in s 524(e) that the discharge of the 
debt is personal to a debtor and does not affect any other entity.
311
 Therefore the 
wording in this section clearly suggests that no person, other than the principal debtor, 
is released from their liability to creditors following the confirmation of a 
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reorganisation plan. This finds support in the case of Mellon Bank v Siegel
312
 where it 
was held that the Bankruptcy Code finds application to the relationship between a 
principal debtor and its creditors, and not between the non-debtor and creditors.
313
  
On the other hand, s 105(a) is a blanket provision affording courts the power to 
‘…issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions…’ of chapter 11. This has been relied upon by courts to confirm and 
uphold provisions in a non-consensual reorganisation plan granting the release of non-
debtors in certain circumstances notwithstanding the mandate of s 524(e). This 
interpretation by the courts finds support in Republic Supply v Shoaf
314
 where it was 
held that s 524(e) did not specifically prohibit courts from discharging non-debtors 
where such discharge was an integral part to the reorganisation plan and had been 
accepted by creditors. Significantly, the Bankruptcy Codes fail to provide a scale 
upon which these two competing sections can be weighed up against each other in 
order to determine which section is to be afforded greater consideration. What is clear 
though is that where a reorganisation plan is silent on the release of a non-debtor’s 
liability, the general consensus is that a non-debtor is not released from liability and 
creditors are therefore free to pursue their claims against such non-debtors.
315
  
The divide in opinion is clear between the United States circuit courts when 
considering the difference in interpretation on the interplay between s 105(a) and 
s 524(e) having regard to the issue of whether creditors’ rights are preserved against 
non-debtors notwithstanding their release following the confirmation of a non-
consensual reorganisation plan. Courts, such as the Ninth and Eleven Circuits, have 
held that such a release is prohibited under s 524(e).
316
 Other courts, such as the 
Second and Fourth Circuits, have held that the provisions of s 105(a) afford them 
equitable powers in terms of which they have the right, after having taken into 
consideration particular circumstances, to sanction a non-consensual reorganisation 
plan and consequently safeguard non-debtors against the claims of creditors.
317
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Significantly, following the Enron collapse,
318
 there has been a departure by some 
courts, such as the Second Circuit, on their previous views expressed on being able to 
freely exercise their equitable powers under s 105(a). This was evidenced in the case 
of In re Metromedia Fiber Network Incorporated,
319
 discussed further below, where 
the court specifically acknowledged the factors to be taken into account when 
considering to release non-debtors in the confirmation of a reorganisation plan as laid 
out in the case of the In re Dow Corning Corp.
320
  
 s 105(a): Discharge of Non-Debtors 
It is apparent that the Second, Third and Fourth Circuit courts have adopted a 
more flexible approach in their interpretation of the Bankruptcy Codes and that non-
debtor releases under a non-consensual plan of reorganisation has been treated as 
acceptable under certain circumstances.
321
 In the case of In re Continental Airlines,
322
 
the court was unwilling, based on the circumstances of the particular case concerned, 
to exercise the powers afforded to it under s 105(a) on the basis that the discharge of 
the non-debtors concerned was inappropriate as they did not satisfy even the most 
flexible tests of fairness and necessity by supporting factual findings.
323
 The court 
therefore did not specifically state that it was against the release of non-debtors under 
a non-consensual plan. The court seemed to suggest that although it may not have 
been prepared to grant a discharge in this particular matter, it would grant such 
discharge under a non-consensual reorganisation plan where sufficient evidence was 
placed before it evidencing that it would be fair to do so. The court held that the 
‘hallmarks of permissible non-consensual releases [are] fairness, necessity to the 
reorganisation and specific factual findings to support these conclusions.’
324
 This 
statement has flowed from the court’s favourable reference
325
 to the cases of A.H. 
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 and Securities and Exchange Commission v Drexel Burnham Lambert 
Group Inc (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc).
327
 
In the case of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
328
 the court held that 
notwithstanding the inclusion of non-debtor release provisions in the reorganisation 
plan and that such a release was non-consensual by creditors, it was prepared to 
confirm such plan based on the compensation to be awarded to creditors.
329
 The court 
held that it may ‘…enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided that the 
injunction plays an important role in the debtor’s reorganisation plan.’
330
 Therefore, 
the court in this case was of the view that confirming the release of non-debtors was 
appropriate in the circumstances as it was a crucial component to the settlement and 
reorganisation of the bankrupt entity that claims against the non-debtors were not 
pursued.
331
 This was taken a step further in the case of Monarch Life Ins. Co. v Ropes 
& Gray
332
 where the court held that: 
‘…in extraordinary circumstances it has been held that a bankruptcy court can grant 
permanent injunctive relief essential to enable the formulation and confirmation of a 
plan of reorganisation if, for example non-debtors who would otherwise contribute to 
funding the plan will not settle their mutual claims absent protection from potential 




It was also substantiated in the case of Matter of Munford Inc,
334
 where it was 
held that non-debtors should be released from their obligations to creditors where it 
would in the circumstances be fair and equitable to do so, in particular where such 
non-debtors are an integral part to the success of the reorganisation plan.
335
 Therefore, 
another factor to be taken into consideration when confirming the release of non-
debtors under a reorganisation plan is whether they will materially contribute to the 
reorganisation, mainly in the form of a monetary contribution and, in so doing, satisfy 
creditors’ claims. The notion of substantial contribution by non-debtors was also 
                                                          
326
 Supra note 302. 
327










 65 F. 3d 973 (1
st
 Cir. 1995). 
333
 Ibid at 980-81. 
334
 97 F. 3d 449 (11
th
 Cir. 1996). 
335
 Ibid at 455. 
54 
 
afforded recognition in the case of In re Transit Group Inc
336
 where the release 
provision specified in the reorganisation plan was particularly broad and extended 
such release to, among others, the debtor, the debtor’s professional corporation and 
pension plan for the debtor’s professional corporation.
337
 The court in this matter held 
that s 524(e) does not restrict the release of non-debtors where such debtors have 
made significant contributions to the principal debtor’s reorganisation.
338
 The court 
therefore aligned itself with those courts which have previously adopted a similar 
view that, notwithstanding the mandate of s 524(e), they have the discretionary power 
to make a determination on the confirmation of a non-consensual reorganisation plan 
which releases non-debtors. In doing so, reliance was had on the factors set out in the 
case of In re Dow Corning Corp.
339
 
In the matter of In re Dow Corning Corp,
340
 the court was reluctant to grant the 
release of non-debtors where creditors had not consented to the same, however, it did 
state that an open mind would be kept in ‘unusual circumstances’ which would 
otherwise necessitate the release of non-debtors.
341
 That said, the court examined the 
decisions of A.H. Robins
342
 and Drexel Burnham Lambert Group
343
 and sought to 
articulate on what factors a court would be required to afford consideration to when 
exercising its powers under s 105(a) having regard to non-debtor releases under a non-
consensual reorganisation plan. This includes considering whether: 
(i) ‘the identity of interests between debtor and third party, such as an indemnity 
relationship, are such that a suit against the third party is in essence a suit against the 
debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate; 
(ii) the non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganisation; 
(iii) the injunction is essential to reorganisation to permit the debtor to be free from 
indirect suits that would cause indemnitor contribution claims against the debtor; 
(iv) the impacted creditors overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan; 
(v) the plan provides a method to pay creditors affected by the injunction; 
(vi) the plan provides payment in full to those creditors who choose not to settle; and 
(vii) the bankruptcy court's records support the injunction or release.’344 
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s 524(e): Restriction on Discharge of Non-Debtors 
Courts in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have adopted a strict interpretation 
of the Bankruptcy Codes concerning releases of non-debtors under a non-consensual 
reorganisation plan and have relied on the provisions of s 524(e), as opposed to s 
105(a), when making a determination.
345
 In the case of Union Carbide Corp v 
Newboles
346
 the court stated that the provisions of bankruptcy laws could not be 
waived by private parties through the confirmation of a reorganisation plan.
347
 s 
1129(a) specifically states that where a plan of reorganisation is contrary to the Codes 
such a plan cannot be confirmed and these courts have adopted the view that a non-
debtor discharge is contrary to s 524(e).
348
 In the case of In re American Family 
Enterprises,
349
 the Third Circuit Court made a determination that the contribution of 
one non-debtor party to the reorganisation of the bankrupt entity was sufficient reason 
to release not only that non-debtor, but all other non-debtors as well.
350
 In this regard, 
the court held that  
‘…this court must determine only that sufficient compensation is being paid to the 
class, and need not speculate as to appropriate contribution of each defendant. The 
release of the non-contributing defendants through a settlement agreement is no 
reason for disapproving the compromise.’
351
  
Interestingly and post the Enron collapse, the court in In re Washington 
Mutual Incorporation
352
 rejected the release of non-contributing directors and officers 
which had been determined in a markedly different manner by the court in In re 
American Family Enterprises.
353
 In doing so, the court, among other things, cited the 
factors set out by the court in In re Master Mortgage Investment Fund, Inc,
354
 which 
factors were materially similar to those set out in the case of In re Dow Corning 
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 In taking these factors into account, the court stated held that directors or 
officers’ right of recourse against a debtor does not constitute sufficient grounds for 
release and that to hold so otherwise would ‘…justify a release of directors and 
officers in every bankruptcy case.’
356
 The court also disregarded the debtors’ 
contention that the plan had overwhelmingly been voted in favour of by creditors, 
stating that this was irrelevant in affording consideration to whether directors and 
officers had made a contribution.
357
 The case of In re Washington Mutual, 
Incorporation
358
 evidences a departure by the Third Circuit of approving incidental 
releases of non-contributing non-debtors and the increased difficulty in proving 
relevant factors to release non-debtors, even where creditors have voted in favour of 
their release in the reorganisation plan. 
The court in the case of In re Lowenschuss
359
 refused to confirm a non-
consensual reorganisation plan which purported to release non-debtors. In this case, 
the debtor’s reorganisation plan extended the release not only to the debtor, but also, 
among others, the debtor’s professional corporation and pension fund of that 
corporation.
360
 The court rejected the confirmation of the reorganisation plan on the 
basis that the release of non-debtors was inappropriate and furthermore, significantly, 
that it lacked the authority to confirm a plan on the basis that did not comply with the 
Bankruptcy Codes as specified in s 1129(a)(1). The court further ruled that the 
inclusion of non-debtor release provisions in a reorganisation plan are inconsistent 
with s 524(e).
361
 The court rejected the notion that equitable powers under s 105(a) 
would permit such releases and stated that s 105(a) ‘…does not authorise relief 
inconsistent with more specific law…[and] the specific provision of s 524 displaces 
the court’s equitable powers under s 105(a) to order permanent relief [against the non-
debtor] sought by [the debtor].’
362
 The court in this matter also considered the 1994 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Codes and the inclusion of s 524(g) which followed as 
a result of such amendments. In terms of s 524(g) courts are afforded the right, where 
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certain conditions have been satisfied, to issue injunctions against third parties so as to 
prevent litigation. Having regard to this, the court stated that  
‘[t]he numerous conditions of s 524(g) make it clear that this subsection constitutes a 
narrow rule specifically designed to apply in asbestos cases only…That Congress 
provided explicit authority to bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions in favour of third 
parties in an extremely limited class of cases reinforces the conclusion that s 524(e) 
denies such authority in non-asbestos cases.’
363
 
Similarly to the decision in In re Washington Mutual Incorporation,
364
 the 
court in National Heritage Inc
365
 denied the release of non-debtors where such non-
debtors were the bankrupt entity’s directors and officers. The court was not prepared 
to release these non-debtors where they had only satisfied one of the factors laid out 
by the court in In re Dow Corning Corp.
366
 In making its determination not to release 
the non-debtors the court, among other things, held that the non-debtors had not 
undertaken to continue contributing to the success of the reorganisation plan, the 
release of the non-debtors was not so material such that if they were not released from 
liability the reorganisation plan would fail and the creditors’ vote of the plan was 




In the more recent decision of In re Metromedia Fiber Network 
Incorporated,
368
 the court refused to confirm a plan of reorganisation where the 
findings of the court were insufficient to support the validity of the plan’s non-
consensual debtor release provisions. The reorganisation plan proposed establishing a 
trust by insiders of the debtor which would undertake and implement material 
contributions to creditors and, in return for such contributions, creditors would forfeit 
their rights to claim from certain non-debtors.
369
 The court in this case was reluctant 
to confirm the non-consensual non-debtor release provision in the reorganisation plan 
and remarked that ‘…a non-debtor release is a device that lends itself to abuse…[i]n 
form, it is a release; in effect, it may operate as a bankruptcy discharge arranged 
without filing and without the safeguards of the Code.’
370
 Notwithstanding that it was 
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argued by the non-debtors that the trust contribution was material to the success of the 
reorganisation plan, the court placed reliance on the decision of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group,
371
 and held that the non-debtors had failed to establish grounds upon 




6.4. CREDITORS’ RELIANCE: S 524(E) OR S 105(A)? 
s 524(e) 
As has been evidenced by the examination of cases set out in 6.3 above, the 
confirmation of a non-debtor release under a non-consensual reorganisation plan is 
left to the discretion of the court. Therefore, unlike South African common law where 
creditors’ rights against sureties can be preserved in the deed of suretyship, this is not 
the case under American law where the preservation of creditors’ rights is sought to 
be regulated in statute. There is sound legal and commercial reasoning why courts 
would not uphold a release provision of a non-debtor contained in a non-consensual 
reorganisation plan.  
Legally, it is specified in s 524(e) that the discharge of a principal debtor does 
not affect the liability of any third party.
373
 Commercially and in favouring that 
section of the Code, it would maintain the integrity of third party security such as 
guarantees and suretyships and this would provide comfort to creditors knowing that 
their security has not been compromised.
374
 It is somewhat unimaginable that courts 
have the freedom under s 105(a) to compromise creditors’ rights against non-debtors, 
especially where such creditors have not voted in favour of the release. In my view, I 
agree with the reasoning of the court in Siegel
375
 that the Bankruptcy Codes operate 
for the benefit of a debtor and regulate its relationship with its creditors and does not 
extend beyond such a relationship so as to include non-debtors. If any such extension 
were to be afforded to non-debtors, they themselves would need to submit to the 
bankruptcy courts and file for reorganisation in order to realise a relief from creditors, 
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however, this cannot be accomplished by entering through the back door and forcing 
this issue upon courts during the reorganisation proceedings of a debtor.
376
 
The impact of courts exercising such discretion would undoubtedly have caused 
a ripple effect to filter through to the commercial sphere, in particular financial 
institutions. One would have thought that financial institutions such as banks would 
have strongly advocated against courts’ reliance on s 105(a) given the underlying 
financial risk associated with advancing funding under a security instrument which 
may, or may not, be disregarded. 
 s 105(a) 
Having said this, it is also appreciated, although to a lesser extent in my view, 
why courts would exercise their discretionary powers under s 105(a) in confirming the 
release of a non-debtor under a non-consensual reorganisation plan. In doing so, it 
may result in a non-debtor’s contribution to facilitating the successful implementation 
of a reorganisation plan which would not otherwise have been achieved if the non-
debtor were not released from liability to the creditor. Such release would also sever 
any claim for indemnification or contribution that the non-debtor would pursue 
against the debtor and this would, in turn, afford a ‘true’ fresh start to the bankrupt 




The court in In re Continental Airlines
378
 remarked that consideration must be 
afforded to fairness, necessity to the reorganisation and specific factual findings to 
support the release of a non-debtor under a non-consensual reorganisation plan.
379
 
That said, such a comment is not without merit, however in my opinion, dangerously 
flirts with commercial uncertainty. It is somewhat impossible to determine what a 
court may, or may not, find fair or necessary in a particular circumstance, in particular 
if such factors are beyond the control of the creditor, In other words and following the 
examination of cases in 6.3 above, courts appear to afford greater consideration to 
whether it would be fair and necessary to a non-debtor that they are released as 
opposed to taking into consideration creditors’ interests. On this interpretation it is 
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near impossible for a creditor to influence what may, or may not, be fair and 
necessary to restrict the release of a non-debtor.  
It can also be argued that to allow creditors to proceed to claim against a non-
debtor would be tantamount to a claim against the debtor itself given a non-debtor’s 
right of recourse under surety law or state corporations laws
380
 and support is found 
for this in the case of A.H. Robins,
381
 where for all intents and purposes it was found 
that it would undermine the reorganisation process if creditors’ claims against non-
debtors could be pursued who would, in turn ultimately, look to the bankrupt 
company under their rights of recourse and deny the company a fresh start.
382
 
The various factors to be taken into account by the courts set out in In re Dow 
Corning Corp
383
 are also indicative of courts’ growing reluctance to grant release to 
non-debtors under a non-consensual reorganisation plan. As was clearly evidenced by 
the court in In re Metromedia Fiber Network Incorporated,
384
 it was not prepared to 
grant a release where it could not, among other factors, be shown the release of the 
non-debtors concerned was crucial to the success of the plan. Although the factors to 
be satisfied in confirming non-debtors release in the aforementioned cases are to be 
lauded, given their more conservative and certain approach, they are not above 
reproach. These factors still afford courts a discretion in ultimately determining 
whether or not to grant the release of non-debtors under a non-consensual plan of 
reorganisation. Again, creditors who initially thought that their claims may be secure 
would be left shooting into the darkness of uncertainty if commercial sense does not 
prevail sooner rather than later in these decisions and the broad equitable powers 
bestowed upon courts in s 105(a) are disregarded. 
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7. CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
From the outset, it is undoubtedly clear that South Africa’s business rescue process 
contained in chapter 6 of the Companies Act has sought to materially replicate the 
process set out in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Codes. In this regard and similarly to 
reorganisation proceedings in America, business rescue aims to rehabilitate a 
company which is financially distressed
385
 and enable it to continue with its business 
operations on a solvent basis.
386
 It is expressly stated that the purpose of the 
Companies Act is to promote, among other things, the development of the South 
African economy by ‘encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency’
387
 and 
‘provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a 
manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.’
388
 Creditors 
play no small part in assisting entrepreneurs by advancing funding in assisting them to 
satisfy their working capital requirements; which funding, in the case of juristic 
persons, is often secured by a deed of suretyship. This has called into question a 
creditor’s right of enforceability of an underlying deed of suretyship in circumstances 
where the entrepreneurs fail and are placed under business rescue. 
The Companies Act ‘is to be interpreted and applied in manner’
389
 that gives 
effect to its purpose. In doing so and where appropriate, courts may turn to consider 
foreign company law in interpreting and applying the Companies Act in order to 
promote its purpose.
390
 It is against this background that an analysis of the Bankruptcy 
Codes was undertaken in chapters 5 and 6 above. This chapter 7 sets out a 
comparative analysis on chapter 11 reorganisation proceedings under American 
Bankruptcy Codes and chapter 6 business rescue proceedings under the South African 
Companies Act. First, a brief comparison will be undertaken on the role of a business 
rescue practitioner and whether this should be developed. Secondly and more 
significantly, a comparative analysis and conclusion will be presented on creditors’ 
rights to enforce third party suretyships of financially distressed companies. 
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7.2. THE BUSINESS RESCUE PRACTIONER 
Undoubtedly, the success of business rescue hinges on a business rescue 
practitioner who is tasked with populating a business rescue plan. As discussed 
throughout this research paper, the business rescue plan has an effect on creditors’ 
rights to enforce their claims against sureties. Under South African law a business 
rescue practitioner is appointed
391
 and is tasked with supervising a financially 
distressed company’s management and operations.
392
 Under the Bankruptcy Codes 
the appointment of a trustee,
393
 who would occupy a role similar to that of a business 
rescue practitioner, is not the default position and the bankrupt debtor remains in 
possession of its business and exercises control over its assets and business.
394
  
Under South African law and following the commencement of business rescue 
proceedings, the business rescue practitioner has ‘full management control of the 
company in substitution for its board and pre-existing management.’
395
 Therefore the 
business rescue practitioner is the person ultimately tasked with facilitating the 
rehabilitation of the operational enterprise of a financially distressed company. 
Although under no obligation to do so, a business rescue practitioner may consult 
with directors of a financially distressed entity in order to make management 
decisions
396
 and the directors are also required to act in accordance with instructions 
received from the practitioner.
397
 This is not the case under the Bankruptcy Codes 
where, unless a trustee has been appointed, the management and control remains 
under the supervision of the current management of the bankrupt entity. In my view, 
this is an aspect of South African law which the legislature should contemplate 
revisiting as it is central to the success of business rescue proceedings.  
Although it is fully appreciated that it is most likely as a consequence of 
existing management’s actions that a company has commenced business rescue, in my 
opinion such management should be afforded the opportunity to reorganise their 
mismanagement and resuscitate the financially distressed company. Management and 
the board are familiar with the affairs of the distressed entity and are in the position to 
direct where attention should be focused to facilitate the rehabilitation process.   
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In any event and as can be drawn from the Bankruptcy Codes, an individual 
with functions similar to those of the U.S. trustee can be appointed to supervise the 
business rescue process without actively being involved in management decisions.
398
 
To the extent that management and the board remain incapable of facilitating the 
rehabilitation of the financially distressed company
399
 then an independent, third party 
business rescue practitioner can be appointed to step in and attempt to save the 
company. In my opinion this is a crucial component of business rescue proceedings 
which needs to be reconsidered by the legislature to assist in the business rescue 
process.  
In my view, the business rescue practitioner should in fact take a step back 
from being actively involved and running with the affairs of a distressed entity. 
Having the correct person in place to administer the business rescue process, which I 
suggest should be the debtor’s management and board itself as opposed to the 
business rescue practitioner, is a crucial first step for the success of the process. In my 
opinion and in the absence of such redevelopment, we will continue to see business 
rescue fail until such time as the people who were initially responsible for a 
company’s commencement of such proceedings regain the reigns of management and 
assume responsibility. If the board and management are unable to facilitate the 
rehabilitation process then, and in such an event, a business rescue practitioner should 
be appointed. 
 
7.3. CREDITORS’ RIGHTS AGAINST SURETIES  
In the case of Tuning Fork
400
 it was held that the Companies Act fails to 
expressly regulate what creditors’ rights are against a surety of a financially distressed 
company where there has been a discharge of such a company’s debt under a business 
rescue plan.
401
 The position is markedly different in America where creditors’ rights 
against non-debtors are embedded in the Bankruptcy Codes and fall to be regulated 
under s 524(e). This section of the Bankruptcy Codes states that a ‘…discharge of a 
debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of 
any other entity for, such debt.’ This notwithstanding, courts in America have sought 
to escape the express mandate of s 524(e) by placing reliance on s 105(a) of the 
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Bankruptcy Codes which grants to them the power to ‘…issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out…’ reorganisation proceedings 
under the Bankruptcy Codes.  
As mentioned in 7.1 above, chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Codes was carefully 
considered by the legislature when populating chapter 6 of the Companies Act. It is 
therefore somewhat surprising that the legislature failed to expressly state whether the 
principle underlying s 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Codes applies to business rescue. 
Given that American law specifically regulates the position of creditors at s 524(e) of 
the Bankruptcy Codes, one would be forgiven for being of the view that a line has 
been drawn in the sand on this issue and sureties are not released following the 
confirmation of a non-consensual reorganisation plan. This is not the case however as 
has been evidenced by the cases of Drexel Burnham Lampert Group
402
 and In re 
Transit Group Inc.
403
 In my view, American jurisprudence is operating in greater 
uncertainty on this issue than its South African counterpart, notwithstanding that this 
issue is regulated by statute in America.  
As discussed at length in 4.3 above and in my opinion, the reasoning 
underlying the decision of Rogers J in Tuning Fork
404
 is correct. Having said this, 
there is still unresolved confusion following Wallis J’s comment in obiter
405
 in the 
case of New Port.
406
 Although it is clear from the decision in New Port
407
 that a deed 
of suretyship specifically preserving a creditor’s right is enforceable against a surety 
pursuant to business rescue proceedings,
408
 there are still questions which remain 
unanswered.
409
 In my opinion and for the most part, although the law in South Africa 
on creditors’ rights against sureties of distressed companies appears to have been 
determined correctly, consideration is to be afforded whether there can be any 
potential development of the law on this issue. Although I strongly advocate the need 
for commercial certainty, I do appreciate, even though this may be to a lesser extent, 
that a degree of flexibility could be exercised by our courts to discharge sureties 
where necessitated by the circumstances of a particular matter. If South African courts 
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are in the future tasked with exercising their discretion as to whether to uphold a 
business rescue plan and order the absolute release of sureties, comparative reliance 
can most certainly be placed on the Bankruptcy Codes. 
 Commercial certainty: Advocating a restrictive approach 
Before turning to address the development of creditors’ rights against sureties, 
I maintain the view that commercial certainty is critical. To provide otherwise would 
not only significantly impact on creditors’ rights, but wold cripple the South African 
economy given that creditors would have no way of knowing whether they can 
exercise their remedial rights of enforcement under security instruments such as 
suretyships. In my view, the certainty which exists and allows creditors to confidently 
proceed against sureties, notwithstanding the legal moratorium in favour of a 
financially distressed entity, is also called for when seeking to determine creditors’ 
ability to enforce their claims against sureties following the adoption of a business 







 it is now trite law that the protection of the legal moratorium does not 
extend to the benefit of any party other than a financially distressed entity.
413
  
Although the Bankruptcy Codes impose an automatic stay against creditors
414
 
similar to that of the legal moratorium, and as was illustrated by the examination of 
A.H. Robins Company Incorporated,
415
 courts in America have the self-imposed right 
to extend the automatic stay to sureties. The extension of the benefit is not 
consistently applied throughout America and therefore it is not a reliable comparative 
source and I am of opinion that South African courts have in any event correctly 
determined the issue in ruling that the legal moratorium is for the benefit of a 
financially distressed company, not its sureties. In my view, this makes logical sense 
given that business recue proceedings are initiated by a financially distressed 
company and chapter 6 as a whole is geared towards such a company and not its 
sureties. After all, the purpose and focus of chapter 6 is the rehabilitation of entities 
which are financially distressed, not their sureties. If any such extension were to be 
afforded to sureties, they themselves would need to similarly submit to business 
                                                          
410
 Supra note 65, 
411
 Supra note 83. 
412
 Supra note 108. 
413
 Ibid paras 28-9. 
414
 s 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Codes. 
415
 Supra note 302. 
66 
 
rescue to realise a relief from creditors, however, this cannot be accomplished by 
entering through the back door and forcing this issue upon courts during the business 
rescue of a debtor.
416
 
In further developing South African company law on the issue of whether 
creditors are able to enforce their rights against sureties of entities under business 
rescue, one can look to the Bankruptcy Codes to regulate the position by means of 
statute. If it were not for the broad equitable powers afforded to courts under s 105(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Codes, it would be clear from the provisions of s 524(e) of such 
Codes that a discharge of a principal debtor does not release sureties regardless of 
whether this is purportedly achieved by a business rescue plan which has been voted 
in favour of by creditors. Therefore and in my view, South African company law on 
the issue of creditors’ right against sureties of entities under business rescue needs to 





 This can be accomplished with comparative reference to s 524(e) of the 
Bankruptcy Codes which makes it clear that under no circumstances does a discharge 
of the principal debtor consequently result in the release of third party sureties. The 
statutory introduction in the Companies Act of a provision materially similar to 
s 524(e) would leave the issue beyond reproach and significantly promote commercial 
certainty. 
 Flexibility: Advocating a liberal approach 
Although to a lesser extent, I do appreciate why an open-mind must be kept in 
developing South African company law such that it allows for courts to exercise their 
discretion in upholding the absolute release of sureties following the discharge of a 
principal debtor under a business rescue plan. In doing so, it may result in a surety’s 
contribution to facilitating the implementation of a business rescue plan which would 
not otherwise have been achieved if they had not been released from their liability to 
creditors. 
Comparative reference can be drawn from the court’s remarks in In re 
Continental Airlines
419
 where the notions of fairness and necessity were considered in 
whether to release a surety under a reorganisation plan which had not been supported 
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by creditors. As was advocated by the introduction of text materially similar to s 
524(e) for commercial certainty, the same can be said for introducing a provision in 
the South African Companies Act materially similar to that of s 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Codes in terms of which courts are afforded broad equitable powers. That 
said and significantly, what can be extracted from American jurisprudence is that a 
regulatory framework needs to be established in statute which specifically sets out the 
factors on which courts can place reliance when making decisions to exercise their 
discretion and release sureties. 
Although it can be advocated that a degree of flexibility is to be introduced in 
South African company law, a situation similar to that which currently exists in 
America, where there is a division of opinion, needs to be avoided. In my view, there 
must be tried and tested factors regulated by statute against which courts can measure 
their discretion. I agree with the commentary in the case of In re Dow Corning 
Corp
420
 where the court held that ‘unusual circumstances’ would need to exist to 
otherwise necessitate the release of sureties.
421
 Therefore, hand in hand with the 
introduction of a provision materially similar to that of s 105(a), my suggestion would 
be the inclusion of several factors similar to those which the court laid out in In re 
Dow Corning Corp.
422
 For example, these factors could include, among other things, 
examining the relationship between a debtor and the surety to determine whether a 
claim against the surety is essentially a claim against the debtor, considering whether 
the surety has contributed significantly to the rehabilitation of the distressed entity and 
determining whether the absolute release of the surety is essential to the business 
rescue process. This would provide some background against which courts can test 
granting the absolute release of sureties following the adoption of a business rescue 
plan especially where, among other things, such sureties are crucial to the success of 
the plan and a claim against the surety would be tantamount to a claim against the 
debtor. 
Having said all of this, careful consideration would need to be afforded by 
proponents of this approach to the way in which amendments are introduced in a 
regulatory framework. s 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Codes has far-reaching 
consequences and therefore any introduction of a materially similar provision would 
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need to be administered with caution so as not to have an undesirable effect on other 
provisions of the Companies Act where the exercise of discretion by a court is 
undesired. It is proposed that such amendments specifically be introduced under, and 
only find application to, chapter 6 to avoid the aforementioned concerns. 
In my opinion and as can be noted from my support of the restrictive approach 
by introducing a provisions similar to s 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Codes, a more 
flexible approach brings with it a host of challenges of its own volition which, in turn, 
would cause a ripple effect of uncertainty to filter through to the commercial sphere.  
 
7.4. CONCLUSION 
In this research paper, I considered the nature of business rescue and 
suretyships. In doing so, I considered the current legal position on creditors’ rights 
against sureties during business rescue proceedings, specifically pre and post the 
adoption of a business rescue plan. As was identified in chapter 4 above and in my 
opinion, South African company law on this issue has for the most part been 
determined correctly, however, there remain several unresolved issues. In reference to 
American jurisprudence, I elaborated on the legal position of creditors’ rights against 
non-debtors of entities which have filed for bankruptcy reorganisation proceedings. In 
doing so, I reviewed how American courts have differently applied the interplay 
between s 524(e) and s 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Codes in determining whether to 
release non-debtors under a non-consensual reorganisation plan. My comparative 
analysis undertaken on the respective legal positions adopted by the South African 
and American courts advocated the importance of commercial certainty and that 
whilst there is potential to develop South African company law having reference to 
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